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THE WRECKAGE OF RECKLESSNESS 
GEOFFREY CHRISTOPHER RAPP∗ 
“Recklessness” is one of the oldest concepts in Anglo-American tort law, 
and it is also one of the most poorly understood. Often identified as a tort 
falling somewhere between “negligence” and “intentional misconduct,” 
recklessness has evaded precise judicial interpretation for two hundred 
years. The Restatement of Torts defines recklessness as conscious 
disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm, but courts have been 
unable to interpret consistently the key elements of this definition. This 
Article suggests that judicial confusion is not simply the product of 
linguistic imprecision on the part of the American Law Institute (ALI). 
Rather, the Restatement version of recklessness is inconsistent with the 
actual behavioral and cognitive processes humans employ in the face of 
risk and uncertainty. Recent work in behavioral economics and 
neuroeconomics indicates that individuals fail to process risk in the way 
the black-letter definition of recklessness presumes, and calls into 
question the degree to which decisions can easily be classified as 
“conscious” or “unconscious.” Rather than continue to struggle to add 
clarity to an already convoluted articulation of doctrine, law reformers 
should reconceptualize the tort concept of recklessness not in terms of 
what it is, but in terms of what it does: allow a particular plaintiff to 
recover for a defendant’s carelessness where ordinary negligence 
doctrine would bar relief. 
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On their own they perished on account of their / own recklessness, / 
the fools.1 
Recklessness is one of the oldest concepts in Anglo-American tort 
law,2 although it has been known by many names.3 The U.S. Supreme 
Court first applied a recklessness standard in common carrier and 
admiralty cases in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s.4 In England, the origins 
of recklessness lie with distinctions made between “degrees of care” in 
bailment cases at the dawn of the eighteenth century.5 As a critical 
component of mental state analysis in criminal law, recklessness became 
an important legal concept in twentieth century American codification 
 
 
 1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 1.7–8 (W.B. Stanford ed., MacMillan 1965), translated in Darrel 
Dobbs, Reckless Rationalism and Heroic Reverence in Homer’s Odyssey, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 
494 (1987). 
 2. The concept can be dated to Roman Law, which supposedly divided negligence into three 
degrees: slight, ordinary, and gross negligence. See Nicholas St. John Green, The Three Degrees of 
Negligence, in ESSAYS ON TORT AND CRIME 93, 94 (1933). 
 3. Recklessness is sometimes equated with gross negligence, although others suggest that gross 
negligence “carries a meaning that is less than recklessness.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
PHYSICAL HARM § 2 cmt. a (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005); Edwin H. Byrd, III, Comment, Reflections on 
Willful, Wanton, Reckless and Gross Negligence, 48 LA. L. REV. 1383, 1384 n.7 (1988). Sometimes 
the term used is “willful or wanton misconduct,” although willfulness suggests a level of intent that 
may or may not be present in reckless conduct. See REST. 3D, § 2 cmt. a; Jim Hasenfus, Comment, 
The Role of Recklessness in American Systems of Comparative Fault, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 399 
(1982); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 213 (5th ed. 
1984) (stating the term “willful” should be given mere “lip service”). There are even differences in 
spelling: Sometimes “wilful” is the preferred spelling, other times “willful.” See Hasenfus, supra, at 
400 n.6. Dean Prosser viewed the choice between terms as one of simple “taste.” WILLIAM PROSSER, 
LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971).  
 4. See, e.g., Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. 469, 475 (1853) (holding the omission to 
exercise skill one has in management of boilers on a steamship amounts to “gross negligence”); N.J. 
Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant’s Bank, 47 U.S. 344 (1848) (holding that the failure to exercise 
even slight care to avoid fire amounts to recklessness and is akin to fraud on a shipping line’s 
customers). In legal scholarship, an early mention of recklessness appears in a 1906 Harvard Law 
Review article on the assumption of risk doctrine by Francis Bohlen, eventual author of the First 
Restatement of Torts. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
44 (2003) (citing Francis Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 91 (1906)). 
 5. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 34, at 181. Chief Justice Holt adopted the degrees of care approach 
in a 1704 bailment case, and later writers on bailments supported the position. Id. This standard was 
extended outside of the arena of bailments in the latter part of that century; for example, in the form of 
the special “gross negligence” standard applied to attorney malpractice. See JAMES OLDHAM, 
ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 280, 282 (2004). Under this standard, attorneys 
were not liable “for every error or mistake,” but could be made to pay when found to have engaged in 
“gross negligence.” Id. at 280. Certainly, the English House of Lords was sufficiently familiar with 
recklessness so as to discuss it as a standard in fraud cases by the end of the nineteenth century. See, 
e.g., Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.) (appeal taken from A.C.). 
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efforts, namely the Model Penal Code (MPC),6 and those developments in 
turn influenced tort law.7 
 
 
 6. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985). 
 7. While this Article will occasionally make reference to criminal law concepts and the Model 
Penal Code, my focus is on the tort of recklessness, not the criminal law mental state. The importance 
of fine line distinctions between recklessness, negligence, and intent in the criminal law may not be as 
significant as similar distinctions in tort. Criminal defendants are entitled to application of the law 
according to the principle that punitive laws ought to be interpreted to provide maximum protection to 
the accused. This is the so-called rule of lenity. See Rachel E. Barkow, Tribute to Justice Antonin 
Scalia, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 15, 17–18 (2006); see generally Zachary Price, The Rule of 
Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (2004). 
 Where conduct falls on the border of recklessness and knowledge, or recklessness and 
negligence, in the criminal law context, a court will likely categorize conduct to favor the accused. 
See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2434 n.111 (2006) (rule of lenity 
especially important where statutes impose minimal mens rea requirements). That is to say, criminal 
law has a built-in mechanism for resolving boundary line disputes. See id. at 2434–37. Tort law has no 
such interpretive principle, and thus the fine lines between recklessness, negligence, and intentional 
tort are of central importance.  
 Arguably, the principle of proximate cause serves this function in negligence cases, by 
prohibiting recovery by plaintiffs too remote from a defendant’s wrongful conduct. David Kurzweil, 
Criminal and Civil RICO: Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal 
Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41, 57 (1996). It is of course true that proximate 
cause analysis is in theory a part of a recklessness case. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 
cmt. d (1979) (“In determining liability, the factors are the same as those used in determining the 
existence of legal causation when there has been negligence (see § 442) or recklessness. (See 
§ 501).”); Stephen M. Blitz, Conduct Evidencing Negligent Entrustment is Provable Despite 
Admission of Vicarious Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 539, 542 (1965). But see Mary H. Seminara, When 
the Party’s Over: McGuiggan v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. and the Emergence of a 
Social Host Liability Standard in Massachusetts, 68 B.U. L. REV. 193, 214 (1988) (“A recklessness 
standard does not require a court to determine the existence of elements such as duty, proximate 
cause, or foreseeability.”). However, a finding of foreseeability is virtually automatic once the 
subjective awareness standard required for recklessness has been overcome. Still, at least in principle, 
the proximate cause link between a reckless actor’s misconduct and a plaintiff’s injury could be 
severed by the superseding conduct of a more blameworthy wrongdoer. 
 Moreover, my decision to avoid addressing the Model Penal Code and the criminal concept of 
recklessness in depth has to do with my own focus as a scholar, not because of a principled belief that 
there is not substantial spillover between the criminal and the tort concepts of recklessness. James 
Henderson and Aaron Twerski argue that concepts like intent and recklessness must be  
kept endogenous to tort without adjusting for how those elements are conceptualized in 
nonlegal contexts or in legal contexts other than tort. Thus, the fact that in Shakespeare’s 
tragedies “intent” may carry a special meaning that helps the playwright achieve dramatic 
impact, or the fact that “intent” has a special meaning in criminal statutes, should be 
irrelevant to the drafter of a Restatement of Torts. A Restatement of Torts speaks to, and only 
to, the tort system of which it is a constituent part. Other systems—Shakespearian tragedies, 
systems of criminal justice, and the like—should be left to conceptualize intent and 
recklessness on their own, perhaps quite differently. 
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of 
Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 One wonders whether the Shakespeare metaphor here glosses over important questions of 
whether tort and criminal law should utilize a common lexicon. No one is actually wrestling with 
whether the Restatement’s definition of intent is consistent with the Bard’s. But it may be unrealistic 
to imagine a world where a judge sitting on a court of general jurisdiction deciding an “intent” case 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/3
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Yet in spite of its lengthy history, recklessness has remained one of the 
murkiest standards in tort.8 It has rarely been the subject of academic 
analysis.9 In the courts, the definition of recklessness has remained 
elusive.10 
Recklessness matters. It is often a threshold standard for imposing 
liability in contexts where “assumption of risk” and other affirmative 
defenses would otherwise bar a plaintiff from recovering.11 In the personal 
injury context, participants in athletic events assume the risk of 
 
 
under the state’s Model Penal Code one day and an “intent” case invoking the Restatement of Torts 
the next will not be influenced, in each endeavor, by the other. This sort of “subject matter 
isolationism” is necessary in scholarly work, particularly when an author has limitations of expertise, 
but arguably irresponsible in the drafting of documents of far more practical consequence. See 
Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996) 
(“The basic conceptual problem is just how any legal system can juggle more distinctions that it can 
use.”). In fact, courts have sought to harmonize criminal and tort concepts of recklessness and 
regularly apply the same definition in each context. See, e.g., Sandler v. Commonwealth, 644 N.E.2d 
641, 643 (Mass. 1995) (“Our long-standing custom has been to measure reckless conduct by the same 
test whether reckless conduct is alleged as the basis for liability in tort or as the basis for guilt of 
involuntary manslaughter.”); Lamb v. Anderson, 147 P.3d 736, 745 (Alaska 2006) (criminal and tort 
standards for recklessness are virtually identical). 
 While this Article devotes relatively little time to exploring recklessness as a criminal mental 
state, the conclusions drawn about the impact of new findings of behavioral economics and 
neuroscience for conceptualizing consciousness do have implications for the study of crime and 
punishment.  
 8. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Denominator Blindness Effect: Accident 
Frequencies and the Misjudgment of Recklessness, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 72, 73 (2004) (“[W]hat is 
meant by recklessness is not well defined.”); Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s 
Mens Rea Provisions be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 189 (2003) (meaning of elements of 
recklessness is “ambiguous”); Gregory A. Williams, Note, Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive 
Restriction upon Punitive Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless Conduct, 
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 572 n.176 (1987) (judicial imprecision with regard to terminology makes 
tracking the meaning of various recklessness standards difficult). The murkiness of the term 
“recklessness” extends outside of the law. For instance, a “contemporary edition of Noah Webster’s 
An American Dictionary of the English Language makes no mention of recklessness.” Rickie Sonpal, 
Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2204 (2003) (citing NOAH 
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1490 (Springfield, Mass. 1869)). 
 9. A Westlaw search reveals no full length law review article focused on the tort of 
recklessness in the past twenty-five years. Professor Kenneth Simons has done some of the most 
interesting analysis of recklessness in recent years, but then generally as part of articles focusing on 
negligence, intent, or tort and crime as a whole. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of 
Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283 (2002) [hereinafter Simons, 
Dimensions]; Simons, supra note 8; Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 
463 (1992) [hereinafter Simons, Rethinking]. Anthony Sebok has also explored recklessness in a 
shorter symposium piece, drawing on Simons’ work. See Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and 
Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (2001).  
 10. See infra Part III; see also Sebok, supra note 9, at 1181 (“[R]ecklessness has sat on the 
borderline between intent and negligence, playing a limited role.”); Simons, Rethinking, supra note 9, 
at 472 (recklessness is “ill-defined”). 
 11. Harvey S. Perlman & Gary T. Schwartz, General Principles, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 
11 (2000). 
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negligently caused injuries, but not those arising from reckless disregard 
of one another’s safety.12 Recklessness is an essential means of recovery 
for tort victims suing governmental entities, who may be barred by 
statutes conferring some form of sovereign immunity.13 Recklessness, like 
intentional tort, can trigger the application of punitive damages, rarely 
available in other accidental injury cases.14 Reckless conduct can provide 
a basis for recovery for injured professional rescuers, otherwise barred by 
the application of the so-called Firefighters’ Rule.15 And a defendant’s 
recklessness trumps a plaintiff’s contributory or comparative negligence.16 
The financial significance of a finding of recklessness—for both plaintiffs 
and defendants—is obvious. 
Recklessness is most often explained as conduct falling somewhere 
along the spectrum between negligence and intentional tort.17 At one end 
 
 
 12. See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994). 
 13. See, e.g., Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical 
Research and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641, 684 
(2004). 
 14. See Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1402 (1987). 
 15. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS B28 (1999). In some states, this rule is referred to as the 
“Fireman's Rule,” although since it applies to both genders and often encompasses emergency medical 
technicians and other professional rescuers, the term “professional rescuers' doctrine” is probably the 
most accurate. 
 16. Conversely, courts are split on whether a plaintiff’s recklessness should bar or simply reduce 
a plaintiff’s recovery from negligent defendants. See Hasenfus, supra note 3, at 400–01. 
 17. In modern casebooks, recklessness often appears as a sort of afterthought, nestled between 
intentional tort and negligence. See, e.g., ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: 
CASES, STATUTES AND PROBLEMS 128 (2d ed. 2007) (“In terms of fault or blameworthiness, 
recklessness falls in between intentional tort and negligence.”); DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW 
& PRACTICE 17 (3d ed. 2006) (“Recklessness is a more culpable type of fault than negligence and 
usually can be invoked in accident situations where the conduct shows a conscious disregard of a high 
risk of harm. Recklessness falls somewhere between intentional misconduct and negligence on the 
culpability continuum.”); MARK A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 451 (8th ed. 
2006) (“‘Reckless’ and ‘willful and wanton’ are of course complex notions.”); DAN B. DOBBS & 
PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 49–50 (2005) (in defining recklessness, “line drawing can be difficult.”). 
Some casebooks contain no discussion of recklessness at all. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., TORTS: 
CASES, PROBLEMS & EXERCISES (2d ed. 2005); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS 
PROCESS (7th ed. 2007); RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (8th ed. 2004); WARD 
FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS (2004). Similar language has been 
employed by the courts. See, e.g., Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 59 (Or. 1960) (“Misconduct 
may be conceived as ranging in infinite gradations from the slightest inadvertence to the most 
malicious purpose to inflict injury . . . . At the upper end of the scale we set off intentional conduct, 
i.e., conduct engaged in for the purpose of inflicting harm on another. At the opposite and lower end 
of the scale is a range of inadvertent conduct which we call negligence. Between these two extremes 
the law has created still another category which is described variously as reckless, willful, or wanton 
conduct.”); Pomaro v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. #21, 662 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(recklessness exists on a “sliding scale” between negligence and intentional tort). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/3
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of this spectrum is negligence, conceptualized in the modern doctrine as 
foreseeable damage caused by a departure from the standard of care 
exercised by a reasonably prudent person.18 At the other extreme are the 
intentional torts, such as assault and battery, involving damage caused by 
an act accompanied by the desire to produce harm or a disregard of a 
substantial certainty of producing a harmful result.19 
Recklessness is said to involve something “worse” or “more 
blameworthy” than unreasonably risky or careless conduct (negligence), 
but something “better” or “less blameworthy” than a desired injurious 
result flowing from an intentional unlawful act (intentional tort).20 To 
situate recklessness in this manner is deceptively easy and deceptively 
clear,21 for it ignores the fact that the spectrum itself has never been 
defined.22 Sometimes this spectrum is a moral one,23 invoking the 
imprecise concept of “wrongfulness,”24 sometimes it centers on a 
wrongdoer’s intent, sometimes the cost of avoidance,25 and other times it 
involves the probability that a particular course of conduct will yield a 
damaging consequence.26 
 
 
 18. Simons, Dimensions, supra note 9, at 286 (“[T]he primary fault underlying a negligence 
claim is the actor’s failure to take a reasonable precaution against the risk of harm.”). 
 19. See Simons, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 471–72 (“After ‘intent’ (which includes 
knowledge), the next most serious mental state in the conventional tort hierarchy is recklessness.”). 
 20. See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1061, 1079 (2006) (“‘Intentional wrongdoers,’ as we tend to call them, are [said to be] the worst type 
of tortfeasor, worse than merely reckless or negligent actors.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 65, at 
462 (recklessness “differs from negligence not only in degree but in kind, and in the social 
condemnation attached to it.”). 
 21. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1137 (“[T]he oft-encountered ‘culpability 
spectrum,’ suggesting a natural progression from negligence to recklessness to intentional tort, is 
neither necessarily accurate nor particularly helpful.”); Posting of Geoffrey Rapp to Sports Law Blog, 
http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/05/wanton-and-willful-he-did-it-on.html (May, 1, 2006, 21:05 
EST). 
 22. See Simons, supra note 20, at 1080 (“When we compare actual legal standards within the 
three categories of torts, we are often comparing apples and oranges.”). 
 23. Then Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in 1884 that 
“recklessness in a moral sense means a certain state of consciousness with reference to the 
consequences of one’s acts.” Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 175 (1884), reprinted in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 275 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). The “dominant 
vocabulary of tort” is infected with moral theory. Gerald J. Postema, Introduction: Search for An 
Explanatory Theory of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 
2001). 
 24. Cf. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 331 (1992) (“[W]rongdoing consists in the 
unjustifiable or otherwise impermissible injuring of others’ legitimate interests. Wrongdoing is 
unjustifiable harming.”). 
 25. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 181–84 (1987). 
 26. See Dean Richardson, Player Violence: An Essay on Torts and Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
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Identifying recklessness solely by reference to two torts—intentional 
misconduct and negligence—which it is not, does little to help courts 
confronted with the task of deciding whether a particular wrongdoer’s 
actions amount to reckless conduct.27 Further, saying that recklessness 
falls between negligence and intentional tort does nothing to equip judges 
to distinguish recklessness from either of these poles of misconduct.28 
Courts are faced with the task of drawing fine lines,29 which means, 
unsurprisingly, that they are not likely to produce consistent or predictable 
results.30 
Wading into the judicial mire,31 law reformers at the ALI have made 
several efforts to clarify this elusive concept.32 In the First Restatement of 
Torts, recklessness was defined as conduct creating an unreasonable risk 
of bodily harm and a high probability of substantial harm.33 Drawing on 
 
 
REV. 133, 139 (2004). 
 27. The North Carolina Supreme Court referred to recklessness as occupying a “twilight zone 
which exists somewhere between ordinary negligence and intentional injury.” Pleasant v. Johnson, 
325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. 1985). 
 28. See Byrd, supra note 3, at 1383 (courts are “dismayed over the difficulty involved in the 
interpretation and application of” the terms recklessness, wanton and willful misconduct, and gross 
negligence). 
 29. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contribution Rights, and Settlement 
Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1165–66 (1996) (“Many people have noted the fine line between 
recklessness and negligence. But there is an equally fine line between recklessness and knowledge.”); 
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Trustees in Trouble: Holding Bankruptcy Trustees Personally Liable for 
Professional Negligence, 35 CONN. L. REV. 525, 551 (2003) (“A ‘fine line [exists] between the 
concepts of ‘recklessness and wantonness’ and ‘intentional’ activities.’”) (citing Lee R. Russ, 
Aggravated Forms of Negligence, Gross Negligence, Wantonness, Recklessness, in 8 COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 119:4 (3d ed. 1997)); Gregory G. Jackson, Punishments for Reckless Skiing—Is the Law 
Too Extreme?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 619, 632 (2002) (“There is often a fine line between an innocent 
mistake that results in an accident and recklessness.”); Thomas F. Miller, Note, Torts and Sports: Has 
Michigan Joined the Wrong Team with Ritchie-Gamester?, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 132 (2002) 
(“[F]ind[ing] the fine line between negligence and recklessness” is “taxing”); Heidi M. Hurd & 
Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 333, 335 (2002) (“Such a 
classification scheme demands that we be able to identify an intentional wrong, distinguish it from a 
reckless one, and distinguish both of these sorts of wrongs from a merely negligent wrong.”). 
 30. Byrd, supra note 3, at 1396 (“Although the tests were formulated to help courts identify 
requisite conduct, they do little to guide the courts in practical application to current disputes.”); 
Miller, supra note 29, at 132 (“In light of the potential line-drawing confusion, verdicts are likely to 
be inconsistent.”). 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. Professor Alan Schwartz and Dean Robert Scott describe the ALI as a “self-perpetuating 
organization of lawyers, judges, and academics” with the “primary function” of promulgating 
“restatements of law.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private 
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596 (1995). The Restatements are “sets of rules, organized by 
subject matter, the content of which is partly a function of case law but also is a function of the ALI’s 
collective view respecting which legal rules are normatively desirable for courts to apply.” Id.  
 33. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 500 (1934).  
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this definition, the Second Restatement of Torts34 offered an influential 
but complex explanation, in which recklessness was characterized as 
physical harm caused by an actor’s conscious and knowing disregard of a 
substantial risk.35 While the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts would 
make some textual improvements,36 it remains to be seen whether those 
efforts will find an appreciative audience among the nation’s courts.37  
As law reformers began to retool recklessness, defining the term as 
consciously disregarding substantial risks, they also expanded the scope 
of intentional tort. Intentional tort came to mean not just the desired 
injurious consequence flowing from a wrongful act, but also injuries 
arising from acts which the wrongdoer believes have a substantial 
certainty of producing a harmful result.38 Belief in substantial certainty 
has been called the “strangest of all” tort concepts39 and inconsistent with 
any familiar mental state.40 Exactly what “substantial certainty” means is 
unclear—something less than an absolute certainty, at least.41 It must also 
mean something more than highly probable certainty, or else the intent 
category will simply collapse into recklessness.42 In this Article, I will 
argue that given what behavioral economics and neuroeconomics have 
recently taught us about human decision making in the face of risk, it is 
fair to say that such a collapse has already occurred.43 
Now that intentional tort includes not just the desired wrong, but also 
an act with a substantial certainty of producing a harmful result, it is time 
 
 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1979). 
 35. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1152. 
 36. The Third Restatement separates recklessness from negligence in that the former includes a 
significant high-level risk and an awareness by the actor of a relatively high level of risk. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM §§ 2–3 (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005); Simons, 
Dimensions, supra note 9, at 287–88; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1155.  
 37. The Third Restatement has now been released in draft form, but the relevant section defining 
recklessness has yet to be cited by any American court. 
 38. See REST. 2D, § 8A. The First Restatement contained no definition of intent, perhaps since 
the authors assumed its meaning was perfectly understood. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1166. The Second 
Restatement included a two-prong definition of intent—including both “intent as desire” and the 
“substantial certainty” language adopted from a Washington Supreme Court battery case. See id.; 
REST. 2D, § 8A. The Draft Third Restatement would attempt to harmonize tort intent with the Model 
Penal Code by characterizing intent as being an act with either “purpose” or a “knowledge” (of a 
substantial certainty). REST. 3D, § 1 & cmt. a. Insofar as it would import criminal mental state 
concepts into tort law, this effort has been criticized. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1153–54. 
 39. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1173. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. The Restatement’s authors suggest a sliding scale—beginning with certainty (intent), 
decreasing to substantial certainty (intent), then decreasing further to something “less than substantial 
certainty” (recklessness), and then falling to “only . . . a risk” (negligence). REST. 2D, § 8A cmt. b.  
 42. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1173. 
 43. See infra Part IV. 
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to ask whether there is any space left for recklessness between negligence 
and intentional tort.44 That is to say, is it really possible to act in a manner 
that is more than unreasonable, without acting with at least a belief in a 
substantial certainty of producing a harmful result? 
An exploration of modern behavioral psychology, including the 
heuristics popular with adherents of “behavioral law and economics,” 
coupled with a consideration of modern neuroscience and 
neuroeconomics,45 reveals a picture of human decision making in risky 
and uncertain situations that is wholly inconsistent with the black-letter 
articulation of recklessness.46 Both intentional tort and negligence now 
stretch into areas of conduct that seem to fall under the law’s definition of 
recklessness. The new science suggests that any effort to continue to draw 
boundaries around recklessness will be ineffective. 
Humans do of course engage in reckless conduct, but not in the way 
that term is defined in law. Reckless conduct sometimes follows 
underassessment of risk. When an actor has miscalculated or failed to 
appreciate a risk, she cannot be said to have acted in “conscious 
disregard” of that risk, even though she may have been negligent. Other 
times, “reckless” conduct involves proceeding with a dangerous course of 
action while ignoring its known risks. But when an actor has rejected a 
substantial certainty of a harmful result, she satisfies the legal standard of 
intent and a resort to recklessness is unnecessary. In other words, while 
negligence is a valid concept of human decision making, in the sense that 
a person might unreasonably disregard a risk due to over-optimism, quick 
decision making or instinct, and while a person can certainly “intend” (in 
the broad sense of that term) an unfortunate result, the definition of 
recklessness is at best a set of words that do not accurately describe the 
way humans think and act.47 
 
 
 44. Of course, any model must necessarily simplify. See Simons, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 
467. But oversimplifying, or simplifying in an inaccurate fashion, need not be tolerated, or at least 
need not remain unquestioned. 
 45. Neuroscience uses “imaging of brain activity and other techniques to infer details about how 
the brain works.” Colin Camerer et al., Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, 
43 J. ECON. LIT. 9, 9 (2005). 
 46. The issue of organizational recklessness is a complex one that, due to space limitations, this 
Article does not address. How a fictional but mindless person could be “conscious” of anything is an 
interesting philosophical question, and of course organizational recklessness matters immensely, 
particularly in the assessment of punitive damages against major corporations. See LANDES & 
POSNER, supra note 25, at 182 n.53. Nevertheless, because modern behavioral economics and 
neuroscience offer more interesting insights into human consciousness, I have chosen to leave the 
issues of organizational recklessness for another day. 
 47. The notion that tort law should “express cognitive reality” dates back at least to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s efforts to establish a general theory of tort law. See DAVID ROSENBERG, THE 
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This is not to say that recklessness is a tort with no value. Perhaps 
recklessness ought to be preserved for its policy advantages.48 For 
instance, some deserving plaintiffs might be barred from pursuing an 
intentional tort case due to the expiration of an applicable statute of 
limitations.49 And perhaps recklessness serves to allow some particularly 
sympathetic victims to recover where an action for negligence, due to the 
survival of the “all-or-nothing” defense of assumption of risk, is not 
available as an option.50 But if recklessness exists solely to advance such 
policy ends, it is time to make that clear. The questionable articulation of 
the doctrine dominant today creates unnecessary confusion as courts 
search for the elements of this elusive tort.51 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the importance of recklessness in 
American tort law. As noted above, there are numerous instances in which 
a plaintiff injured in an accident cannot recover using negligence, but 
could recover using recklessness. Part II explores the origins of the tort of 
recklessness and law reformers’ influential efforts in the various tort 
Restatements to define the elements of reckless conduct. Part III then 
describes the significant judicial confusion that abounds as courts have 
wrestled with the complex definitions provided. Part IV explores the 
behavioral psychology and neuroscientific literature in order to reveal a 
picture of human decision making inconsistent with the legal definition of 
recklessness. Part V explores the way forward, suggesting a new approach 
to describing recklessness, including new language for a future torts 
Restatement, aimed to reduce the inaccuracy embedded in the current 
articulation of recklessness.52 Finally, Part VI concludes. 
 
 
HIDDEN HOLMES: HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 103 (1995). 
 48. See Byrd, supra note 3, at 1398 (“The use of consciousness as a reference point disguises 
what courts are in fact doing—making policy judgments under particular circumstances.”). 
 49. Perhaps the most famous recklessness case to date, Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 
601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), could easily have been pursued as an intentional tort save for the fact 
that the plaintiff had missed the deadline for filing such a suit. See infra Part III.A.  
 50. See Sebok, supra note 9, at 1181 (“One might see recklessness as a gatekeeper: sometimes it 
allows the practical and moral consequences of intentional tort to be visited on certain actors who 
otherwise were innocent of harboring a specific desire of harming anyone.”). 
 51. See Byrd, supra note 3, at 1409 (“Such a standard provides little guidance and only clouds 
the analysis that should be performed.”). Recklessness as used in this Article refers to the complete 
tort of “reckless conduct,” rather than to just a state of mind or element of other torts, crimes, or 
defenses. 
 52. The call to clarify the distinction between recklessness and negligence is not a novel one. In 
1853, United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis wrote that the distinction between “slight 
negligence,” “ordinary negligence,” and “gross negligence” (recklessness), ought to be abolished:  
It may be doubted if these terms can be usefully applied in practice. Their meaning is not 
fixed, or capable of being so. One degree, thus described, not only may be confounded with 
another, but it is quite impracticable exactly to distinguish them. Their signification 
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I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECKLESSNESS IN TORT LAW 
The importance of the distinctions among negligence, recklessness, 
and intentional tort cannot be understated.53 Sometimes this strange, 
“borderline” tort is treated, consequentially, like intentional tort,54 while 
other times it is treated like negligence.55 Where recklessness is treated 
with the severe consequences usually applied to intentional tort, the line 
between negligence and recklessness becomes critically important. 
Conversely, where recklessness is treated like negligence, with somewhat 
less severe consequences, the line between recklessness and intentional 
misconduct is what matters.56 
A. Recklessness Treated Like Intentional Tort 
In a number of legal contexts, recklessness is treated like the “worst” 
kind of tort, intentional misconduct. This typically means that the reckless 
defendant will be forced to pay higher damages, or will be exposed to 
liability that would not apply were the defendant deemed merely 
negligent. 
Perhaps most significantly, punitive damages may only be available in 
cases of intentional tort or recklessness.57 Negligence is generally not 
considered an appropriate basis for punitive damages since negligent 
defendants lack the “evil motive” needed to justify a punitive damages 
award.58 Plaintiffs’ expanded efforts in recent decades to obtain punitive 
 
 
necessarily varies according to circumstances, to whose influence the courts have been 
forced to yield, until there are so many real exceptions that the rules themselves can scarcely 
be said to have a general operation. . . . If the law furnishes no definition of the terms gross 
negligence, or ordinary negligence, which can be applied in practice, but leaves it to the jury 
to determine, in each case, what the duty was, and what omissions amount to a breach of it, it 
would seem that imperfect and confessedly unsuccessful attempts to define that duty, had 
better be abandoned. 
Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. 469, 474 (1853). A century and a half later, it may finally be 
time to answer this call. 
 53. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1168 (“[O]ne can imagine that predictable struggles emerge between 
plaintiffs and defense-oriented advocates over the effects on liability of labeling an action 
‘intentional,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘negligent.’”). 
 54. See infra Part I.A. 
 55. See infra Part I.B. 
 56. This is an issue of “enduring doctrinal importance.” Sebok, supra note 9, at 1181. 
 57. Id. at 1168; Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999). Punitive damages are 
not always available in intentional tort cases, such as when a physician commits tortious battery by 
exceeding the scope of a patient’s consent. See Simons, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 475. 
 58. David S. Godkin & Marc E. Betinsky, Defenses in Year 2000 Litigation: New Technology, 
Old Theories, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2, 33 n.105 (1999). 
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damages, particularly in mass tort litigation, has led to an increasing 
number of cases concerning recklessness,59 and elevated the importance of 
the distinction between recklessness and mere negligence.  
Recklessness also allows recovery from defendants typically immune 
from liability for mere negligence, either by common law, statute, or 
contract. Municipalities and other governmental agencies generally cannot 
be sued for mere negligence, but can be sued where they are found either 
reckless or liable for intentional harm.60 Another example is the so-called 
Good Samaritan statute, designed to relieve health care workers from 
negligence liability for providing gratuitous, voluntary care to 
nonpatients.61 These statutes aim to increase the likelihood of rescue by 
reducing its potential liability costs.62 Under these statutes, however, 
recklessness typically remains a viable cause of action for an injured 
rescuee.63 Physicians providing gratuitous emergency medical services 
who engage in reckless or intentional misconduct can be sued.64 Often, 
contractual waivers of tort liability (“express assumption of risk”) cannot 
limit a plaintiff’s right to recover for intentional tort or recklessness, even 
though they may be effective in barring a negligence action.65 
Similarly, the application in recklessness cases of various common law 
affirmative defenses, most notably assumption of risk,66 tracks the 
treatment of such defenses in intentional misconduct cases. This rule is 
particularly vital and well-known in regard to injuries suffered in the 
course of recreational sports activities.67 Under the near-universal 
common law rule68 (sometimes codified by statute),69 plaintiffs cannot 
 
 
 59. See Simons, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 484 (“Recent expansion of punitive tort damage 
awards for ‘reckless’ behavior gives urgency to the task of clarifying the concept.”); id. at 472; 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 364 n.47 (2003) 
(“[T]here is a general perception among researchers that this category of 'recklessness' punitive 
damages cases is growing in importance.”). 
 60. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1168. 
 61. See David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to 
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 680 (2005).  
 62. See David C. Biggs, “The Good Samaritan is Packing”: An Overview of the Broadened 
Duty to Aid Your Fellowman, with the Modern Desire to Possess Concealed Weapons, 22 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 225, 259 (1997). 
 63. See A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 
1273, 1277 (1983). 
 64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 2 cmt. b (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005). 
 65. See, e .g., Pruett v. Am. Motorcycle Ass’n, No. 93-3887, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11891, at 
*10 (7th Cir. May 7, 1995). 
 66. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1168. 
 67. REST. 3D, § 2 cmt. b. 
 68. See Richardson, supra note 26, at 145 (there are “two principles followed by most 
jurisdictions in both professional and amateur contact sports: (1) negligence cannot form the basis for 
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recover for injuries negligently caused by co-participants during 
recreational athletic events.70 Instead, only reckless or intentionally caused 
injuries are recoverable.71  
Given that potentially harmful contacts are a regular and expected part 
of sports like football, basketball, and soccer, courts have opined that 
subjecting actors to liability for merely “unreasonable” actions would lead 
to a flood of litigation and chill the kind of vigorous participation on 
which competition depends.72 Participants are said to assume the risks of 
negligent contacts, but not of reckless or intentional ones.73 Alternatively, 
the duty of a participant is said to be limited to avoiding reckless or 
intentional harm, but not negligent harm.74 Courts have wrestled with how 
far to extend this doctrine in evaluating cases involving sport-like 
activities that may not fall within the traditional group of “contact 
sports.”75 In an age in which an increasing number of Americans 
 
 
a tort claim by an injured player against another participant who caused the injury, but (2) either 
recklessness or intentional wrongdoing can form the basis of such a claim.”). At one point, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court stood as a notable exception to this clear majority rule, finding that a 
flexible negligence standard can adequately address sports injury cases. Lestina v. West Bend Mut. 
Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Wis. 1993) (“[T]he majority does not fully comprehend the objectives of 
other courts in adopting the recklessness standard.”). However, the state legislature adopted a statute 
aimed at changing the standard for co-participant liability to recklessness. See Jay A. Urban, Sports 
Torts in Wisconsin, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 365, 368 (1998). 
 69. Richardson, supra note 26, at 164–65. 
 70. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992); Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 605 (N.J. 
1994).  
 71. Professor Simons points out that intentionality in this context cannot mean the same thing as 
it ordinarily does in intentional tort cases, where merely intending the act can sometimes be the basis 
for a finding of intentional tort. In contact sports, of course, all sorts of intentional torts are not 
actionable due to consent. Merely intending an act is not the basis for a finding of intent sufficient to 
allow recovery for, say, wrongful battery. Instead, a sports injury plaintiff must allege intentional 
harming. See Simons, supra note 20, at 1082–83. Similarly, he points out that courts allowing 
recovery for recklessness in sports injury cases “must be using the term ‘reckless’ in a special sense. 
. . . Perhaps some courts have adopted recklessness as the liability standard because the term can also 
refer to an attitude of indifference to the welfare of others, a personal callousness that goes well 
beyond mere violations of rules against certain types of contacts.” Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of 
Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 273 n.218 
(1987).  
 72. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[S]ubjecting 
another to unreasonable risk of harm, the essence of negligence, is inherent in the game of football, 
for admittedly it is violent.”); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
While some have argued that this no-recovery-for-negligence rule should be limited only to violent 
contacts sports, courts have generally incorporated it in the context of other sports, such as golf. See 
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Golfers’ Tort Liability—A Critique of an Emerging Standard, 24 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 317, 318–19 (2002). 
 73. Knight, 834 P.2d at 698. 
 74. Id.; Randolph Stuart Sergent, Gross, Reckless, Wanton, and Indifferent: Gross Negligence in 
Maryland Civil Law, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2000). 
 75. See Mallin v. Paesani, 892 A.2d 1043 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding “contact sports” 
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participate and are injured in recreational athletics,76 litigation involving 
such injuries has risen.  
The distinction between recklessness and negligence also determines 
whether a plaintiff’s contributory or comparative negligence can be used 
to eliminate or reduce recovery. In jurisdictions that follow traditional 
contributory negligence, an absolute bar on recovery by plaintiffs, the 
defense is not available where a defendant has been reckless.77 In 
comparative negligence regimes, courts have taken two approaches to 
handling a reckless defendant. Some offset a plaintiff’s negligence against 
a defendant’s recklessness,78 while others refuse to do so.79  
Another context in which recklessness is treated like intentional tort is 
that of a landowner’s liability to persons injured on her property. Under 
rules that survive in most jurisdictions, persons on another property are 
divided into various categories: licensees, invitees, and trespassers.80 The 
right of trespassers in particular to recover is limited in cases of 
landowners’ mere negligence. Many jurisdictions do not allow trespassers 
to recover for a landowner’s negligence, but would allow recovery for 
recklessness or intentional tort.81 
At one point in time, recklessness was also significant in that it 
allowed a plaintiff to avoid the application of an automobile guest statute, 
although the importance of such statutes has now evaporated.82 
 
 
exception does not apply to golf under Connecticut law); Davis v. LeCuyer, 849 N.E.2d 750 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2006); Aquila v. LaMalfa, No. 2005-L-148, 2007 WL 1125724 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007); 
Posting of Geoffrey Rapp to Sports Law Blog, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2007/02/is-potato-sack-
racing-contact-sport.html (Feb. 27, 2007, 11:43 EST); Posting of Geoffrey Rapp to Sports Law Blog, 
http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/06/indiana-court-declines-to-extend-co.html (June 28, 2006, 
15:21 EDT). 
 76. See Richardson, supra note 26, at 134; Urban, supra note 68, at 365. 
 77. This is explained by the fact that the defendant’s conduct is “so close to intentional 
wrongdoing that he should not have the benefit of contributory negligence.” VICTOR SCHWARTZ, 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5-3(a), at 120 (3d ed. 1994).  
 78. Id. § 5-3(b), at 120. 
 79. See Hasenfus, supra note 3, at 401. Where a plaintiff, rather than a defendant, can be labeled 
reckless, a further issue concerns whether such a plaintiff would have any right to recover from 
merely negligent defendants. 
 80. Even within these categories, courts draw further distinctions, such as between “criminal” 
trespassers and “mere” trespassers. See Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts 
Revolution: The Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REV. 725, 741 (1992). 
 81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 2 cmt. b (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005); 
Sergent, supra note 74, at 2. 
 82. A guest statute would otherwise protect vehicle owner-drivers from liability for injuries 
suffered by passengers. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 161–62. According to Dean Prosser, there was “no 
other group of statutes which have filled the courts with appeals on so many knotty little problems 
involving petty and otherwise entirely inconsequential points of law.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, 
§ 34. In addition to distinguishing recklessness from ordinary negligence, courts were forced to deal 
with convoluted choice of law cases. 
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B. Recklessness Treated Like Negligence 
In other contexts, recklessness is treated more like negligence than 
intentional tort. Where conduct is deemed reckless but not intentional in 
these instances, a wrongdoer typically receives greater favor in the eyes of 
the law. 
For instance, the line between recklessness and intentional misconduct 
determines whether a tort judgment will be dischargeable in bankruptcy.83 
In bankruptcy cases, like tort liability arising from negligence, liability for 
recklessness is dischargeable, whereas liability arising from intentional 
misconduct is not.84 
In the workers’ compensation context, the line between recklessness 
and intentional tort determines whether an injured worker will be able to 
avoid the application of the workers’ compensation system.85 Workers 
injured through recklessness by their employer, like workers injured 
through negligence, are sometimes compensated according to the statutory 
scheme, with a workers’ compensation claim being the worker’s sole 
remedy.86 By contrast, workers injured on the job due to an employer’s 
intentional misconduct can pursue typically larger recoveries in court. 
Recklessness also surfaces in doctrines and statutes relating to 
contribution and indemnification among joint tortfeasors. When multiple 
wrongdoers have caused a plaintiff’s injury, they can seek contribution 
from one another for payments made in excess of their comparative fault. 
Wrongdoers who were negligent and reckless may pursue such 
contribution, but wrongdoers who have committed intentional torts 
typically cannot.87 
In the liability insurance context, most policies are written to cover an 
insured’s losses arising from negligent or reckless tort liability, but 
exclude “expected” or intentionally caused injuries.88 Under such policies, 
 
 
 As a result of judicial frustration, many legislatures responded by repealing their guest statutes. 
Id. Therefore, the importance of such statutes and common law guest doctrines has fallen in recent 
years. Such statutes and doctrines are no longer common, but still exist in some jurisdictions. See 
REST. 3D, § 2 cmt. b. Alabama may be the only state which still has a general automobile guest 
statute. Id. § 2 rpt. note. 
 83. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1168. 
 84. Id. at 1181. An exception exists for injuries caused by reckless drunk driving, which are not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1168; Parker B. Potter, Revisiting the Scrap Heap: The Decline and Fall of Smith v. 
F.W. Morse & Co., 4 PIERCE L. REV. 481, 488 (2006). 
 86. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1181. This is not the universal rule. See Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 
S.E.2d 244, 244 (N.C. 1985). 
 87. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1181. 
 88. Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 921 
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recklessness is generally viewed as an accident and a policy-holder’s 
losses will be covered.89 
Recklessness is also subject to negligence-like statutes of limitation.90 
Typically, intentional torts have short statutes of limitation.91 While 
intentional torts are the so-called worst torts, they are also torts for which 
an accusation of responsibility is considered to have the greatest potential 
reputational harm.92 Statutes of limitations serve to force plaintiffs to seek 
prompt legal relief and militate against the filing of “stale claims.”93 
Where a defendant has acted recklessly rather than intentionally, however, 
the plaintiff has a longer time period to commence her action.94 
II. THE RESTATEMENTS ON RECKLESSNESS  
A. The First and Second Restatements 
The Restatement of Torts was first published in 1934 as part of the 
ALI’s efforts to clarify and reform common law.95 The Restatement 
(First) of Torts contained the following definition of recklessness:  
§ 500. Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined 
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another 
if he intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his 
duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts 
which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor’s 
conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the 
 
 
(2004); Sebok, supra note 9, at 1168, 1181. 
 89. Kirkpatrick v. AIU Ins. Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 850, 856 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Whether an insurer 
has an obligation to advance litigation or defense costs where a plaintiff has alleged both recklessness 
and intentional tort is a more complicated question. 
 90. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1168. 
 91. Johnson, supra note 88, at 923. 
 92. Intentional torts often overlap with criminal offenses, and the accusation of criminal 
misconduct is considered to pose particularly severe damage to one’s reputation under defamation 
law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 670 cmt. a (1979). 
 93. Grell v. Laci Le Beau Corp., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 361–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 928 (Cal. 1988)). 
 94. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 525 (10th Cir. 1979) (recklessness 
has a six-year statute of limitations under Colorado law, while battery has a one-year statute of 
limitations). 
 95. For an excellent history of the ALI and the Restatement project, see generally G. Edward 
White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 1 (1997). 
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other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial 
harm will result to him.96 
In a “special note,” the authors of the First Restatement clarify that its 
definition of recklessness would encompass what legislatures and courts 
call “wanton and wilful misconduct.”97 Despite offering this expansive 
view of what recklessness means, the definition appears to be quite 
cumbersome and clunky. This is, after all, a single sentence that goes on 
for five lines. It contains clause upon clause, as well as a number of quite 
ambiguous adverbs and adjectives. 
Three decades later, the Restatement (Second) of Torts did very little 
to clean up this language. Despite repeated references to recklessness in 
other substantive sections, the authors of the Second Restatement did very 
little to define the concept.98 Instead, section 500 of the Second 
Restatement simply added a few touches to the parallel section from the 
earlier ALI product.99 The Second Restatement’s version, which is not 
even included in the ALI’s official “concise” Restatement book,100 
provides: 
§ 500. Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined 
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another 
if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his 
duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts 
which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his 
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, 
but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is 
necessary to make his conduct negligent.101 
Did anything significant change between these two versions? Three 
modifications stand out, although the authors offer little description of 
why such changes were made or their intended legal consequences.  
 
 
 96. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 500 (1934). 
 97. See id., § 500 spec. note. 
 98. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1151. 
 99. The Second Restatement’s “Scope Note” is significantly modified, focusing in two pages on 
the role of recklessness in determining landowners’ liability to trespassers and licensees. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1979). This likely reflects the large number of cases 
between the publication of the First and Second Restatements addressing this issue. 
 100. See A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 99–100 (2000). Why would the ALI omit section 
500 from its own version of the Restatement, marketed to law students and others? The ALI seems to 
recognize that section 500 has contributed to judicial confusion. One might even ask whether the 
section is a bit of an embarrassment. It is certainly not an example of fine legal drafting. 
 101. REST. 2D, § 500. 
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First, the term “bodily harm” is changed to “physical harm.” What 
exactly is meant by that distinction is unclear since the terms usually 
mean the same thing.102 Perhaps bodily harm suggests too grave an 
invasion, whereas physical harm allows for somewhat less injurious 
results, although that is not the connotation given to the term “bodily 
harm” elsewhere in the Restatement.103 The First Restatement’s authors 
seemed to view recklessness as limited to cases in which a plaintiff was 
exposed to loss of life or limb. To these scholars, only risks that involve a 
“high degree of probability that death or serious bodily harm will result 
therefrom” would trigger recklessness liability.104 While the change from 
bodily to physical may have been designed to loosen this apparent 
requirement, the Second Restatement’s authors could have been far more 
clear. Moreover, section 500 appears limited to “physical harm,” even 
though recklessness is applied to nonphysical harms elsewhere in the 
Restatement.105  
Second, the word “intentionally” in the first clause of the definition 
was moved. In other words, while the First Restatement talked about 
“intentionally . . . act[ing]”106 or “fail[ing] to . . . act” the Second 
Restatement talked about “act[ing]” or “intentionally fail[ing] to . . . 
act.”107 The authors offer no comment to explain this change, which has 
led to some confusion in the courts.108 The phrase “does an act or 
intentionally fails to do an act” is viewed as “clumsy and redundant,” with 
“acts or fails to act” considered a better alternative.109  
Third, the authors have added the final clause, attempting to clarify 
that the risk posed by reckless conduct exceeds the minimum level 
necessary to label the conduct negligent. In so doing, the Second 
Restatement elevates this supposed distinction, which had appeared thirty 
years before in commentary but not in the provision itself.110 The First 
Restatement’s commentary explained that reckless conduct “must be 
 
 
 102. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (5th ed. 1979) (“physical injury” means “bodily harm 
or hurt, excluding mental distress, fright, or emotional disturbance”); REST. 2D, § 905 cmt. b (“bodily 
harm” means “any impairment of the physical condition of the body, including illness or physical 
pain”).  
 103. See REST. 2D, § 905 cmt. b (“Bodily harm is any impairment of the physical condition of the 
body, including illness or physical pain.”). 
 104. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1934). 
 105. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1151. 
 106. REST. 1ST, § 500 (emphasis added). 
 107. REST. 2D, § 500 (emphasis added). 
 108. See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 109. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1151. 
 110. See REST. 1ST, § 500 cmt. g. 
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something more than negligent.”111 Recklessness must “contain a risk of 
harm to others in excess of that necessary to make the conduct 
unreasonable and therefore, negligent” and “must involve an easily 
perceptible danger of substantial bodily harm or death and the chance that 
it will so result must be great.”112 The Second Restatement places that 
language in the section itself—a change in style but not in substance. 
In additional commentary in both versions of the definition, the 
authors attempt to provide further guidance. Comments f and g aim to 
distinguish recklessness from intentional misconduct and negligence, 
respectively.113 Despite their importance for the actual judicial 
determinations of boundary-line disputes, these comments make “little or 
no sense” and the differences they attempt to draw are “difficult to see.”114 
Recklessness differs from negligence in that it “requires a conscious 
choice of a course of action” involving knowledge of “serious danger.”115 
While sometimes negligence and recklessness may differ only as a matter 
of degrees of risk, this “difference of degree is so marked as to amount 
substantially to a difference in kind.”116 
For conduct to be reckless, the “act or breach of duty” must “itself [be] 
intended.”117 Still, recklessness is not intentional tort. The authors explain:  
While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor 
does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough 
that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that 
there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though he 
hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless.118 
Second Restatement comment a explains the two kinds of 
recklessness: deliberate (in)action in the face of a known risk; or 
(in)action in the face of facts that would make the risk apparent to a 
reasonable person, even though the wrongdoer himself need not grasp that 
risk.119 Second Restatement comment b, although entitled “perception of 
 
 
 111. Id. § 500 cmt. a. 
 112. Id. 
 113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. f & g (1979). 
 114. Sebok, supra note 9, at 1179 n.29. 
 115. REST. 1ST, § 500 cmt. g; REST. 2D, § 500 cmt. g. This language may have played an 
important role in helping the drafters of the Model Penal Code define recklessness as consciously 
disregarding a substantial or unjustifiable risk of harm. See infra Part II.D. 
 116. REST. 1ST, § 500 cmt. g. 
 117. Id. § 500 cmt. b. 
 118. Id. § 500 cmt. f. 
 119. REST. 2D, § 500 cmt. a. 
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risk,” is actually about the requirement that the “act or omission” leading 
to the harm be “itself intended.”120 
Scholars have identified numerous problems with the Second 
Restatement’s approach. Most notably, section 500 includes no language 
implicating a sense of the callousness, depravity, and self-conscious 
gratuitousness that lend recklessness its wrongful moral character.121 More 
significantly, as demonstrated in the following subsection and in Part III, 
these articulations of recklessness have not provided an adequate roadmap 
for courts attempting to render tort decisions. 
B. Where Things Stand 
As a result of these efforts, the black-letter definition of recklessness 
has come to occupy an odd place in tort law. Recklessness, intentional 
tort, and negligence can be compared along two dimensions: cognitivity 
and subjectivity. By cognitivity, I mean the degree to which the notion 
references the mental processes that led to a wrongful act. By subjectivity, 
I mean the degree to which the law considers the actual mental processes 
of a defendant, rather than the constructive mental processes of a 
reasonable person.  
Recklessness is both cognitive and subjective. Negligence is neither 
cognitive nor subjective. Intentional tort can be both, or neither. 
Recklessness definitively appears to be cognitive, in the sense that it 
requires an inquiry into the consciousness of the wrongdoer.122 In the 
same vein, it appears that the threshold test for recklessness is 
subjective.123  
By contrast, negligence is neither cognitive nor subjective124 since it 
asks only whether the wrongdoer failed to act as a reasonable person 
would have acted.125 A court evaluating a claim of negligence need 
merely define the reasonable level of precaution—an uncertain but 
 
 
 120. Id. § 500 cmt. b. 
 121. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1152. 
 122. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 175 (1884), reprinted in LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 25, at 275 (recklessness “is understood to depend on the actual condition of the 
individual’s mind with regard to consequences.”). 
 123. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1143; Simons, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 467 
(“The modern account of recklessness, emphasiz[es a] cognitive awareness of a risk . . . .”). Once this 
subjective threshold is met, however, recklessness has objective components involving the level of 
risk and the type of harm posed. See Catheline v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 348 F. Supp. 43, 45 
(M.D. Fla. 1972). 
 124. See Sebok, supra note 9, at 1181–82; COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 333. 
 125. See Richardson, supra note 26, at 147. 
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objective aspiration.126 Considerations of a person’s character and will are 
not relevant in negligence analysis.127 
Intentional tort can be both subjective and cognitive, in one of its 
forms, to the extent that it can be demonstrated via a showing that an actor 
desired to produce a wrongful result.128 But “intent-as-desire” cases, 
though perhaps rare,129 are susceptible to easy resolution without a very 
detailed inquiry into what the wrongdoer knew at the time he acted. Man 
shoots gun at neighbor; man desired to shoot neighbor (or at least to 
assault his neighbor, in which case the transferred intent doctrine would 
allow imposition of liability against the man).130 A showing that a 
wrongdoer acted in a way that had a “substantial certainty” of producing a 
result can suffice to establish intent.131 But like negligence, that is in some 
sense an objective inquiry.132 The intentional tort/substantial certainty 
plaintiff merely needs to establish that the wrongdoer’s action was 
substantially certain to produce the harmful result.133 At most, what 
matters is what the actor believed, not what the actor knew.134 
Recklessness, subjective and cognitive, remains a far more ambiguous 
concept.135 Recklessness can refer to three distinct categories of wrong, 
“either singly or in combination: a state of belief (belief that one is 
creating a substantial risk); a state of desire (reckless indifference); or 
conduct (gross negligence).”136 In recklessness as defined by the 
Restatements, what the actor knew (and consciously disregarded) is, at 
least in theory, all that matters. As we will see through an exploration of 
 
 
 126. But see Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 59 (Or. 1960). 
 127. See Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW 
OF TORTS, supra note 23, at 162. 
 128. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 28–29 (5th ed. 1999). 
 129. Marc Lloyd Frischhertz, Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Scheme: Substantially Certain 
to Result in an Unsafe Workplace, 50 LOY. L. REV. 209, 215 (2004) (“The substantial certainty test 
was developed as an alternative way of establishing actual intent because it is inherently difficult to 
establish subjective desire to cause harm.”). 
 130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 (1979). 
 131. Id. § 8A. 
 132. Thomas A. Gionis et al., The Intentional Tort of Patient Dumping: A New State Cause of 
Action to Address the Shortcomings of the Federal Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), 52 AM. U. L. REV. 173, 301 (2002) (“An objective standard should be used to determine 
whether there was a substantial certainty that the injury would occur.”). 
 133. REST. 2D, § 8A. 
 134. But see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1136 (sometimes, acts one believes to be 
reasonable can lead to international tort liability). 
 135. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 483 (the Restatement “describes the concept in all three 
ways, sometimes emphasizing the gross deficiency of the conduct, sometimes the actor’s subjective 
awareness of risk, and sometimes the actor’s callousness.”). 
 136. Id. at 482. 
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published and unpublished opinions in the area of recklessness, that turns 
out to be a fanciful notion inconsistent with judicial escapades in tortured 
reasoning.137 
But recklessness is unique in another sense. Unlike intent or 
negligence, which may, but need not involve wrongfulness (in the moral 
sense), recklessness has to have some element of “bad attitude.”138 One 
can intend a harmful act, and therefore incur liability, even if one wanted 
to do the right thing.139 One can be negligent simply by being careless or 
inattentive. But one can only be reckless if one has done something 
reprehensible and morally blameworthy.140 
III. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS 
Since the ALI published the Second Restatement, there have been 
hundreds of cases dealing with the tort of recklessness.141 Fortunately, for 
my purposes, I need only highlight a few key discussions that focus on 
courts’ efforts to distinguish recklessness from intentional tort142 and 
recklessness from negligence,143 and to define precisely the “triggers” that 
ought to justify a finding of recklessness. 
The picture revealed is one of considerable confusion,144 as courts have 
 
 
 137. See infra Part III. 
 138. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1144 (describing recklessness as “negligence 
with an attitude”). 
 139. Id. at 1136–37. 
 140. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 71 (1988). The etymology of 
the term “recklessness” suggests that some level of wrongfulness is embedded in its meaning. 
Although the German origins of the term, receleas (“careless, thoughtless, heedless”), implies a close 
connection to negligence, the Dutch variant, roekeloos, means “wicked.” See ONLINE ETYMOLOGY 
DICTIONARY, available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=reckless (last visited Sept. 20, 
2008). 
 141. A keycite (conducted on Mar. 18, 2008) of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1979) 
produced 570 hits in state and federal court opinions between 1969 and 2007. A search for the term 
“recklessness” produced over 10,000 hits in cases between 1969 and 2007. Many if not most of these 
cases are, of course, criminal law decisions. 
 142. See infra Part III.A. 
 143. See infra Part III.B. 
 144. In 1982, James Hasenfus wrote that the various labels applied to recklessness have “led to 
considerable confusion.” Hasenfus, supra note 3, at 400 n.7. A generation later, little further clarity 
has been achieved. The definition of the term remains “nebulous.” See Sergent, supra note 74, at 2. As 
one court explained, “[m]uch confusion has been generated by inconsistent use of loosely defined 
terms such as willfulness, wantonness, recklessness, gross negligence, and unjustifiable conduct.” 
Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., 676 P.2d 162, 164 (Mont. 1984). See also Piamba Cortes v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (study of the cases “reveals a body of law that 
frequently is inconsistent and that provides a vague and nebulous definition of willful misconduct, 
rendering it difficult to apply.”); Burnett v. City of Adrian, 326 N.W.2d 810, 820 (Mich. 1982) 
(definition of recklessness is “fraught with misunderstanding”). 
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“struggled to define” the term recklessness and its contours.145 Courts are 
unsure whether recklessness is closer to intentional tort or negligence, and 
unsure whether the differences between recklessness and whichever pole 
it abuts are differences of kind or of degree.146 The “potential for 
interpretational dispute and linguistic gymnastics is enormous, both 
among laypersons and jurists.”147  
Articulated tort doctrine rarely seems decisive in these cases. In many 
cases, it appears that courts are applying a sort of moral intuition in 
drawing the lines between recklessness and other types of conduct, which 
represents “the judicial process in its most naked form.”148 Courts seem to 
decide whether a defendant’s conduct falls under the label reckless in tort 
cases based on whether the denial of relief to a particular plaintiff would 
be wrong.  
Alternatively, courts may use recklessness—which often justifies 
deviation from the black-letter rules of negligence law—as a sort of 
escape valve when they are uncomfortable with established tort doctrine 
itself. It may then be sentiment not about a particular plaintiff or 
defendant, but rather about a rule itself, that shapes judicial applications of 
recklessness doctrine.149 For example, suppose that a court finds 
unconvincing the notion that participants in sporting events cannot 
recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of co-participants.150 
The court could do one of two things. First, the court could explicitly state 
its objections to such a rule. While that approach might be refreshing—
 
 
 145. Alex L. Rubenstein, Injuries to Public School Students: The Liabilities and Immunities of 
Public Schools and Their Employees, CBA RECORD, Apr. 1996, at 40, 41. 
 146. See Hasenfus, supra note 3, at 401 (“A recurring question in the opinions is whether 
recklessness is fault of a different degree than ordinary negligence, or whether it amounts to fault of a 
different kind altogether.”). 
 147. Gary S. Franklin, Comment, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the 
Smart out of “Smart Money,” 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 993–94 (1986). 
 148. Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 68 (Or. 1960). 
 149. Similar forces may explain some decisions courts have made over the years with respect to 
conflicts of law issues. Some decisions seeming to resist utilization of traditional conflicts principles 
may be explained by judicial rejection of the policy basis for a particular legal rule. See Scott A. Burr, 
The Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to Foreign Conduct: Has Hartford Fire Extinguished 
Considerations of Comity, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 221, 233 (1994) (discussing Foster v. Leggett, 
484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972) (engaging in no governmental interest analysis in deciding to apply 
Kentucky law, which did not feature an automobile guest statute)); Charles M. Thatcher, Choice of 
Law in Multi-State Tort Actions After Owen v. Owen: The Less Things Change . . . , 35 S.D. L. REV. 
372, 380–81 (1990) (discussing Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989)). 
 150. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for instance, found unconvincing the notion that ordinary 
negligence law could not handle contact sports cases without chilling vigorous competition and 
opening the floodgates to sports injury cases. See Simons, supra note 20, at 1083 n.78. The Wisconsin 
legislature, however, responded by creating statutory protection from negligence suits in contact-
sports injury cases. Id. 
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and indeed, seems common in some American appellate courts—it is also 
inconsistent with long-standing norms of judicial modesty.151 A judge 
might be uncomfortable simply declaring that a rule offered by a higher 
court is inconsistent with the judge’s policy views. Instead of casting 
doubt on the rule, however, courts can simply use the recklessness 
“exception to the exception” to allow a case to go to a jury and give the 
plaintiff at least a chance to recover.152 Such an approach might invite 
appellate review and draw attention to the difficulties associated with the 
underlying rule, without appearing to represent a departure from norms of 
stare decisis and an intrusion on the prerogatives of the legislative branch. 
Perhaps the best example of this in practice concerns judicial treatment of 
guest statutes, which typically barred a passenger from suing a driver of a 
car for mere negligence, but often contained an exception to allow suits 
against reckless drivers.153 Courts may have widened the meaning and 
application of recklessness in order to express displeasure at the 
legislature’s inaction in the face of a growing policy critique of guest 
statutes as a whole.154 
Regardless of the source of inconsistent judicial approaches to defining 
recklessness, the resulting confusion and unpredictability has “left its 
wound on our law.”155 In either case, the confusing and muddled 
articulation of the doctrine of recklessness in the First and Second 
Restatements has left room for courts to apply naked intuition to the cases 
before them. With the doctrine itself hopelessly ill-defined, courts have 
not produced systematically coherent jurisprudence in the area. 
 
 
 151. See Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception and then of Common Law Categories, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1359, 1377 (2007). 
 152. Juries, too, might be induced to “stretch” the definition of recklessness in order to allow a 
plaintiff to recover. See Jeffrey O’Connell, Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault & Quasi-Criminal 
Liability, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 880 (1992). 
 153. John T. Cross, The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United States Choice-of-Law, 
36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 462 (2003). 
 154. Chief Justice Stanley Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals famously called guest statutes 
“unfair” or “anachronistic” in 1972. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456 (N.Y. 1972). Some 
courts were so distressed by the harsh results of guest statutes that they embraced rarely utilized 
constitutional doctrines to strike them down. See Emberson v. Buffington, 306 S.W.2d 326 (Ark. 
1957); see also Cynthia Nance, The Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act: How Not 
to Reform Arkansas Defamation Law, 51 ARK. L. REV. 721, 770 (1998) (discussing Emberson).  
Emberson struck down a guest statute on the basis of the “right to a remedy/open courts” provision of 
the state constitution, which provided that “‘Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws 
for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in his person, property or character; he ought to obtain 
justice freely, and without purchase, completely, and without denial, promptly and without delay, 
conformable to the laws.’” Emberson, 306 S.W.2d at 327 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. II, § 13).   
 155. Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 59 (Or. 1960). 
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A. Recklessness and Intent 
At times, it is difficult for courts to distinguish recklessness from 
intentional tort. Recklessness has been described as “tantamount to” or a 
“proxy for” intentional misconduct.156 In his judicial writings, Richard 
Posner has described recklessness as having such a close proximity to 
intentional torts that they are virtually indistinguishable, and are treated 
indistinguishably by the law.157 Courts have emphasized that a reckless 
defendant must “intentionally do the act or intentionally fail to do the act” 
which causes harm, meaning that the defendant must make a choice of a 
“course of action that spells danger.”158  
Sometimes, courts have addressed recklessness in situations where 
intentional tort could easily have been alleged. In the seminal Hackbart 
case,159 a professional football player suffered debilitating injuries after he 
was struck in the back of the head by another player.160 This is, of course, 
a classic battery case.161 While the consent defense to battery might apply 
in many football contact cases, such as a running back’s consent to be 
tackled or a lineman’s consent to be struck in the chest while coming out 
of his stance,162 consent would not have applied in circumstances like 
those in Hackbart because the hit was a “dirty” play well outside the 
expected contacts involved in football.163  
However, Dale Hackbart was unable to recover for battery due to the 
application of an applicable statute of limitations.164 Instead, he pursued 
his claim under alternative theories of recklessness (pursuant to section 
500 of the Second Restatement) and negligence.165 Rather than admit that 
the case could easily have been one of intentional tort, Judge Doyle of the 
Tenth Circuit attempted to distinguish reckless misconduct from 
 
 
 156. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1324 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 157. Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 697 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 158. Williamson, 354 P.2d at 69; see also Spagnulo v. Commonwealth, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 728, 
2006 WL 1238671, at *6 (Mass. Super. 2006) (recklessness must involve “near-intentional” disregard 
of danger). 
 159. Hackbart has been cited sixty-one times by other courts, ranking it second behind Nabozny 
v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (112 citations), among leading recklessness cases. 
 160. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 161. The elements of battery are harmful contact, intent, and causation. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1979). 
 162. See Miller, supra note 29, at 117. 
 163. Hackbart, 601 F.2d. at 525. 
 164. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D. Colo. 1977), rev’d, 601 F.2d 
516. 
 165. Id. 
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intentional tort.166 He wrote, “[r]ecklessness exists where a person knows 
that the act is harmful but fails to realize that it will produce the extreme 
harm which it did produce.”167 Even though a reckless actor may intend 
the act, he does not intend “to inflict serious injury.”168 Intending to inflict 
injury is not, of course, a requirement for intentional tort.169  
Other courts, however, have focused on the Restatements’ varied 
requirements of an “intentional act” or “intentional omission” in 
determining whether a finding of recklessness is appropriate. Maryland 
case law, for example, allows findings of recklessness only upon a 
showing of an “intentional act or omission” by a defendant.170 At times, 
the “intentional act” requirement can be satisfied quite easily.171  
Courts’ consideration of “intentional omission,” however, is more 
perplexing,172 as is the term itself.173 These cases seem to hinge on a 
defendant’s awareness of a duty, or awareness of a potential harm, rather 
than on any particular level of intent with respect to an omission, even 
though the courts frame their discussion in terms of intentional omission. 
While plaintiffs are charged with proving that the “defendant intentionally 
decided” not to perform some obligatory task,174 it is not at all clear how a 
plaintiff is supposed to go about doing so. 
Perhaps the most convoluted discussion of the role of intent in defining 
recklessness has occurred among the appellate courts in Illinois. Illinois 
has a long history of analysis of so-called willful and wanton conduct,175 
 
 
 166. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 524. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See supra notes 19, 38 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Sergent, supra note 74, at 50. 
 171. In one case, a finding of intent sufficient to trigger a conclusion of recklessness was based 
on the intentional act of bringing a “racially inflammatory” letter to an institution. See Md. State Dept. 
of Pers. v. Sealing, 471 A.2d 693, 700 (Md. 1984); Sergent, supra note 74, at 50. 
 172. See, e.g., Galloway v. Walker, 99 P.3d 625, 629 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (inclusion of word 
“intent” in jury instructions in recklessness case not error). 
 173. See Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774, 781 (Neb. 1990) (“It is somewhat puzzling why the 
failure to do an act is modified by ‘intentionally’ whereas doing an act is not.”). The failure to provide 
a legally required accounting by a trustee was deemed insufficient to rise to the level of recklessness 
since there was a lack of proof that the trustee knew of the obligation and “intentionally disregarded 
it.” Jacob v. Davis, 738 A.2d 904, 920 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Sergent, supra note 74, at 50 n.353. 
On the other hand, where a corporation was aware of a leaking gas tank and had a legal duty to correct 
that condition, a court found an intentional omission. Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1006–07 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Sergent, supra note 74, at 50 n.354. 
 174. Sergent, supra note 74, at 50. 
 175. The state code defines these terms, at least with respect to municipal and governmental 
immunity, as follows: “‘Willful and wanton conduct’ as used in this Act means a course of action 
which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an 
utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.” 745 ILL. COMP. 
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originating in early twentieth century jurisprudence applying the in loco 
parentis doctrine in school law.176 By 1976, the state courts recognized 
that their standard of willful and wanton misconduct was consistent with 
section 500 of the Second Restatement.177 Under Illinois law, “willful and 
wanton misconduct” is said to represent a “hybrid between acts 
considered negligent and those found to be intentionally tortious.”178 At 
times, recklessness “may be only degrees more than ordinary negligence,” 
while in other circumstances it “may be only degrees less than intentional 
wrongdoing.”179  
Yet in a series of cases in the 1990s, Illinois created two subcategories 
of willful and wanton misconduct: intentional wanton and willful 
misconduct, and unintentional wanton and willful misconduct.180 The 
courts have thus created four separate categories of tort:181 negligence; 
intentional misconduct; “willful and wanton acts that were committed 
intentionally”;182 and “willful and wanton acts committed recklessly.”183 
In various contexts, this will now require special interrogatories to juries 
asking them to identify whether particular “wanton and willful” 
misconduct is of the “reckless” or “intentional” variety.184 
Recent application reveals the difficulty courts have had with this 
standard.185 The Illinois Supreme Court in 2008 granted defendants’ leave 
to appeal in a challenging case involving an injury suffered by a youth 
hockey player after he was violently checked into the sidewall of a hockey 
rink.186 The defendants  
 
 
STAT. 10/1-210 (2002). 
 176. Drake v. Thomas, 33 N.E.2d 889, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941) (no civil liability for teacher 
imposing corporal punishment absent a showing of wanton and willful conduct or malice). 
 177. Turner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 341 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). 
 178. Poole v. City of Rolling Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ill. 1995). 
 179. Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402, 406 (Ill. 1994). 
 180. Id.; Poole, 656 N.E.2d at 770; Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 522, 
531 (Ill. 1992). 
 181. Arguably, only three categories exist to the extent that “intentional wanton and willful” 
conduct is viewed simply as intentional tort with the necessary label for overcoming various 
applicable immunity provisions. However, since some intentional misconduct might not be 
“blameworthy,” see supra note 174 and accompanying text, intentional but non-wanton conduct 
appears to be a separate, and fourth, category. 
 182. Poole, 656 N.E.2d at 771. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 772. 
 185. See, e.g., Karas v. Strevell (Karas I), 860 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), rev’d and aff’d, 
884 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. 2008); Murray v. Chicago Youth Ctr., 864 N.E.2d 176, 195 (Ill. 2007). 
 186. See Karas v. Strevell (Karas II), 884 N.E.2d 122, 125–26, 129 (Ill. 2008). 
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checked [plaintiff] from behind while he was near the boards that 
formed the wall of the playing rink and while he was partially bent 
over and looking down with his head pointing toward the boards. 
The collision caused [plaintiff’s] head to strike the boards and 
resulted in his serious injury.187 
The defendants’ conduct was alleged to have been reckless, and thus 
outside of the protection of Illinois’ contact sports doctrine,188 because 
they proceeded in this manner heedless of the presence of the word 
“STOP” in large letters on the back of the plaintiff’s jersey.189 In the 
plaintiff’s view, the large lettering served to emphasize the no-checking 
rule which prohibited crashing into another player, and any player who 
ignored the “STOP” warning and violated the rule engaged in wanton and 
willful misconduct.190 
The appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s 
claims against these co-participants, but explained that further inquiry into 
the recklessness of defendants’ conduct would need to be based on “close 
scrutiny” of the developed factual record.191 In particular, the court 
suggested that the recklessness of defendants’ conduct would hinge in 
large part on the curious factor of the location of the puck at the time of 
the incident: 
[T]he complaint notably does not say where the hockey puck was at 
the time the player defendants struck [plaintiff]. The location of the 
puck and, perhaps relatedly, what [plaintiff] and the player 
defendants were attempting to do at the moment of impact are all 
matters yet to be fleshed out by evidence, and those matters might 
well be relevant to [defendants’] states of mind at the time they 
struck [plaintiff]. It is quite possible that, once all the circumstances 
surrounding this incident are revealed, the inference of willful and 
wanton conduct will disappear. However, on the bare facts pled 
here, we can, and therefore must, infer willful and wanton 
conduct.192 
What was really going on here? What created the inference of wanton 
and willful misconduct? Is it that the defendants intended to strike the 
 
 
 187. Karas I, 860 N.E.2d at 1169–70. 
 188. Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (Ill. 1995). 
 189. Karas I, 860 N.E.2d at 1169. 
 190. Id. at 1173. 
 191. Id. at 1172–74. 
 192. Id. at 1174. 
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plaintiff? Or might it be that the court simply found the plaintiff—a youth 
who suffered a terrible and debilitating injury—to be a compelling 
victim? It certainly does not appear that any development of a factual 
record would help a court decide if this conduct is intentional wanton and 
willful misconduct or merely negligent wanton or willful misconduct. 
After defendants appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, the court 
handed down an opinion that hardly clarified the law.193 The court 
reaffirmed that in contact sports, mere negligence could not state a valid 
cause of action. However, the court delineated a special category of 
sports—“full contact sports” (including hockey and football)—in which, 
apparently, even consciously disregarding another’s safety could not be 
grounds for liability.194 Allowing liability even for recklessness, to the 
court, would chill vigorous participation in sports in which harm is an 
inherent and expected part of the game. Instead, legal actions in full 
contact sports could only be based on “extreme misconduct.”195 In 
defining extreme misconduct, however, the court only gave two examples: 
intentional injuring and “conduct . . . ‘totally outside the range of the 
ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”196 Unhelpfully, however, the 
court’s choice of quoted language came from a case which allowed co-
participants to sue each other for injuries resulting from recklessness.197 In 
the case at bar, the court found that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had 
not stated a claim for “extreme misconduct,” although its order gave the 
plaintiff the chance to reargue his case under the newly articulated 
standard. 
Only future case development will (possibly) distinguish this new 
category of “extreme misconduct.”198  
 
 
 193. See Karas II, 884 N.E.2d 122. 
 194. Id. at 132 (“In full-contact sports such as tackle football, and ice hockey where 
bodychecking is permitted, a conscious disregard for the safety of the opposing player is an inherent 
part of the game.”). 
 195. Id. at 134. 
 196. Id. (citation omitted). 
 197. The court cited the California case, Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s claim because facts did demonstrate defendant acted recklessly).  Karas II,  884 
N.E.2d at 137.  
 198. For a perspective from one of the attorneys in the case, see posting of Tim Epstein to Sports 
Law Blog, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2008/02/full-contact-illinois-supreme-court.html (Feb. 25, 
2008, 15:07 EST). 
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B. Recklessness and Negligence 
Recklessness and negligence are both invoked frequently in cases 
involving accidental injuries.199 The line between recklessness and 
negligence is particularly difficult to distinguish,200 and the various factors 
courts take into account in recklessness analysis bear a marked similarity 
to those analyzed in negligence cases. 
One commentator suggested that recklessness ought to be renamed 
“negligent willful misconduct,” even while admitting that such a phrase is 
“equivocal.”201 Some courts have treated recklessness as simply a form of 
negligence. Illinois courts, for example, have noted that recklessness 
“shades imperceptibly into simple negligence.”202  
Wisconsin refers to the concept at various times as “reckless[ness],” 
“rash[ness],” “wanton[ness],” or gross negligence, and specifies that this 
represents “a high percentage of ordinary negligence.”203 This odd 
formulation leaves much to ponder. How is recklessness a high percentage 
of negligence? How is negligence even measured in percentage terms? 
Does this mean that a negligent act can be measured according to a 
percentage of the “reasonableness” a prudent person would employ? And 
if recklessness is somehow reducible to a percentage of negligence, what 
percentage would be sufficient to cross from negligence into recklessness?  
Other courts have sought to distinguish recklessness from negligence 
more precisely, arguing that recklessness, at a minimum, involves some 
higher level of knowledge of risk: 
Reckless conduct is not the same as negligence. Negligence is the 
failure to use such care as a reasonable, prudent, and careful person 
would use under similar circumstances. Reckless conduct differs 
from negligence in that it requires a conscious choice of action, 
either with knowledge of serious danger to others or with 
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any 
reasonable person.204 
 
 
 199. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. AIU Ins. Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 850, 854 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“[C]onduct 
which is reckless . . . does not equate to intentional conduct, but, rather, constitutes an accident or 
occurrence.”). 
 200. Byrd, supra note 3, at 1400. 
 201. SCHWARTZ, supra note 77, at 119. 
 202. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 330 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill. 1975). 
 203. Bielski v. Shulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 112–13 (Wis. 1962). 
 204. Jury Instructions, Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987), cited in Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 73. 
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Yet courts have not always been precise about what a plaintiff would 
need to show to distinguish reckless misconduct from negligence. One 
court said that plaintiff had an obligation to “show something” that “truly 
distinguishes” a recklessness claim from a negligence one.205 Calling on 
plaintiffs to demonstrate a true distinction by showing “something” is 
particularly unhelpful in generating consistent jurisprudence in this area. 
1. Recklessness and Risk of Injury 
The First and Second Restatements establish that recklessness must be 
grounded in a finding of a “substantial risk.”206 The Supreme Court has 
recently opined that the “high risk of harm, objectively assessed . . . is the 
essence of recklessness at common law.”207 While the concept of risk 
itself may be more complicated than the way it is ordinarily treated in the 
law,208 it has been particularly problematic in judicial treatment of 
recklessness since recklessness requires not only unjustified risk, but also 
some aggravated or enhanced level of risk. 
Courts have wrestled with how to quantify this requirement.209 How 
high, exactly, does the probability of a harmful result have to be before a 
finding of recklessness is appropriate? Would it be necessary for a 
plaintiff to show that harm was more likely than not to occur? Would that 
even suffice, or would something even higher than probable be the 
appropriate standard? Largely, courts have been unable to define a 
specific level of risk that would warrant a finding of recklessness. Some 
courts have seemingly admitted defeat, defining the level of risk required 
for recklessness in an entirely circular fashion: reckless conduct is defined 
as “conduct which is characterized by the strong probability of harm that 
recklessness entails.”210 
Some courts have required “almost certain” or “near certain” harm 
before issuing a finding of “substantial risk.”211 Such a requirement, 
 
 
 205. Spagnulo v. Commonwealth, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 728, 2006 WL 1238671, at *3 (Mass. Super. 
2006). 
 206. See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 207. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2007) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 3, § 34 at 213). 
 208. For an interesting discussion of the philosophy of risk and probability, see generally Steven 
R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321 (David 
G. Owen ed., 1995). 
 209. See Sergent, supra note 74, at 58. 
 210. Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1990) (emphasis added). 
 211. See Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 495 A.2d 838, 847 (Md. 1985); Spagnulo v. 
Commonwealth, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 728, 2006 WL 1238671 (Mass. Super. 2006); Sergent, supra note 
74, at 58. 
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obviously, compacts recklessness into intentional misconduct for which a 
“substantial certainty” is required.212 Other times, a far lower standard is 
required: knowing that one’s actions “could cause” harm has been found 
sufficient.213 
Many courts have simply said that recklessness requires, as the 
Restatement indicates, a showing of a “high degree of probability” of 
harm.214 Applying such a standard, words such as “possibility of physical 
harm” are insufficient to trigger recklessness liability.215 Others courts 
have said that the probability that harm will result must be “strong.”216 
However, specific applications reveal courts at times playing fast and 
loose in their analyses of levels of risk. A prime example is the treatment 
of intoxicated driving in recklessness analysis. To be sure, drunk driving 
is widely and no doubt rightly considered immoral.217 At the same time, 
the level of drunk driving in this country is probably so high,218 and the 
proportion of drunk-driving incidents leading to accidents so small,219 that 
 
 
 212. See supra notes 21, 40 and accompanying text. There is simply no meaningful distinction 
between a “substantial certainty” and a “near certainty.” Indeed, a “near certainty” or “almost 
certainty” would seem to be even more certain than a “substantial” one. 
 213. See Md. State Dept. of Pers. v. Sealing, 471 A.2d 693, 700 (Md. 1984); Sergent, supra note 
74, at 60 (internal quotations omitted). 
 214. See Lawhead v. Woodpecker Truck & Equip., Inc., 517 P.2d 283, 286 (Or. 1973) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 70 (Or. 1960). 
 217. See Julie Anne Rah, Note, The Removal of Aliens Who Drink and Drive: Felony DWI as a 
Crime of Violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2109, 2138 (2002) (“To characterize 
a drunk driving accident as a ‘misfortune’ . . . is an injustice to the thousands who have been injured 
or killed by drunk drivers.”); PAUL A. LEBEL, JOHN BARLEYCORN MUST PAY: COMPENSATING THE 
VICTIMS OF DRINKING DRIVERS 4 (1992) (“Any serious accident is likely to produce loss and regret, 
but a drinking-driver accident provokes an additional element of personal and societal anger at the 
fact that unnecessary and unacceptable behavior has contributed to the injury and loss.”); GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 268 (1970) (“Drunken 
driving can be described clearly enough for individuals to know what is considered wrongful totally 
aside from the occurrence of any accident.”). A law and economics approach advises that an ideal 
world would involve liability imposed on drunk drivers regardless of whether an accident results. Id. 
at 269. That is to say, all drunk drivers would be “taxed” for the risk they pose to highway safety. The 
reason such an approach cannot be taken is the high cost of identifying every drunk driver. Id.  
 218. Estimates based on polling data indicate that Americans make between 809 million and one 
billion driving trips a year within two hours of consuming alcohol. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL SURVEY OF DRINKING AND DRIVING ATTITUDES AND 
BEHAVIORS: 2001, described at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/traffic-tech2003/ 
TT280.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2008). At the same time, there are only 254,000 persons injured a 
year as a result of automobile crashes in which alcohol was involved. See 2005 DRUNK DRIVING 
STATISTICS, http://www.alcoholalert.com/drunk-driving-statistics-2005.html (last visited May 28, 
2008). That produces a “injured persons per alcohol driving incident” rate of three one-hundredths of 
one percent, hardly a “substantial” level of risk, no matter how morally reprehensible the conduct may 
be. 
 219. See Gerald S. Reamey, The Growing Role of Fortuity in Texas Criminal Law, 47 S. TEX. L. 
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driving while intoxicated is not consistent with reckless conduct’s defined 
characteristic of a substantial level of risk.220 The Seventh Circuit opined 
that an accident caused by drunk driving is “recklessness at worst and 
misfortune at best.”221  
Yet even where an injury seems to be the result of “misfortune” 
coupled with drunk driving, courts have no problem finding recklessness 
in such cases.222 Courts have found intoxicated driving reckless without 
engaging in any sophisticated analysis of the potential for injurious 
results.223 A Pennsylvania court, for example, noted that automobiles are 
“lethal and deadly weapons,” and that intoxicated driving increases the 
“possibility of death and serious injury . . . substantially” and “presents a 
significant and very real danger to others in the area.”224 The court noted 
that “statistical analyses” show that a high percentage of highway 
fatalities arise from drunk-driving incidents,225 ignoring the fact that this 
correlation says little about the actual risk that drunk driving poses.226  
Arguably, drunk driving might be said to present a substantial risk 
when risk is viewed on an interstitial level. That is to say, drunk driving 
may be many times more risky than sober driving, even if the chance that 
someone will crash on a particular drive (drunk or sober) is quite small. 
Drunk driving might thus be characterized as posing a risk that is more 
substantial than the risk it “should” pose. The First and Second 
Restatements, however, focus on risk in absolute terms.227 They do not 
seem to leave open the possibility that conduct would be labeled reckless 
for posing a greater risk than necessary. The proposed Restatement 
 
 
REV. 59, 90 n.212 (2005) (“[I]f the drunk driver and others sharing the road are lucky, no one will die, 
despite his recklessness in driving while intoxicated.”). 
 220. See Taylor v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 598 P.2d 854, 864–65 (Cal. 1979) (Clark, 
J., dissenting). 
 221. See, e.g., Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 222. See LEBEL, supra note 217, at 43–44. 
 223. See Bourgeois v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 562 So.2d 1177, 1182 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(“[S]everal courts have . . . indicated that a presumption of recklessness can be made when the 
intoxication of the defendant is the cause-in-fact of the accident.”). The Louisiana court in Bourgeois 
rejected this presumption, but nevertheless found the defendant reckless due to his high level of 
intoxication. Id. at 1184. 
 224. Focht v. Rabada, 268 A.2d 157, 161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970). 
 225. Id. at 161 n.1. 
 226. The risk that drunk driving poses would be properly measured through a demonstration of 
the rate of harmful accidents per incident of drunk driving. See supra note 222 and accompanying 
text. 
 227. See supra notes 95–117 and accompanying text. To be more precise, the First and Second 
Restatement discuss the risk required for recklessness relative to the risk required for findings of 
negligence. This, however, seems to capture risk in terms of its absolute level. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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(Third) of Torts might rectify this problem, in that it allows for findings of 
recklessness even where the absolute level of risk was not high, so long as 
the expected harm associated with the risk was far greater than the cost of 
avoidance.228 In the drunk-driving context, one might argue that the risk 
created by drunken driving can be cheaply avoided—say, by taking a $10 
cab ride rather than getting behind the wheel. This avoidance cost pales in 
comparison to the potential harm associated with a highway fatality. As 
noted above, this position is one of the more controversial modifications 
made by the authors of the Third Restatement, and it remains to be seen 
whether it will attract a wide following in the courts.229 
As another example, consider the difficulties courts have had in 
determining whether injuries resulting from stray golf balls can trigger 
recklessness liability.230 Table One provides a listing of some recent cases 
in which courts evaluated the likelihood of a harmful result in determining 
whether to render a finding of recklessness. In one case, a court held that a 
defendant could be found reckless after admitting that he saw plaintiff was 
in the “line of fire” for his golf ball.231 In order to strike the plaintiff, 
however, the defendant not only had to “shank”232 his shot, but also the 
small golf ball must have impacted a victim who occupied a tiny fraction 
of the area in which the golf ball might have flown. Although the 
likelihood of a wayward shot may be high,233 the probability that a shot 
will strike a particular victim, or any victim at all, is low for a single shot. 
This has been recognized in other golf injury cases, where courts have 
rejected allegations of recklessness for injuries arising due to “freak” 
shots.234 
 
 
 228. See infra Part V.C. 
 229. See infra Part V.C. 
 230. See generally Lazaroff, supra note 72. 
 231. See Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 978 (N.J. 2001). 
 232. “In a shank (if you are right handed) the ball squirts almost straight right from the moment 
you hit it.” Pat Dolan, The Shank, TOP END SPORTS, available at http://www.topendsports.com/sport/ 
golf/shank.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
 233. Schick, 767 A.2d at 972. 
 234. See Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 n.2 (Ohio 1990). 
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TABLE ONE: EVALUATING RECKLESSNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ERRANT GOLF SHOTS 
Case Conduct Ruling on 
Recklessness 
Thompson v. 
McNeil235 
Plaintiff went to look for lost ball near a water hazard.236 
Defendant may have warned plaintiff of impending shot.237 
Shot shanked ninety degrees and struck plaintiff.238 
Not reckless239 
Barnhill v. 
Tipple240 
Defendant failed to yell “fore” prior to hitting ball, which 
“sliced” and struck plaintiff.241 
Not reckless242 
Dilger v. 
Moyes243 
Defendant claims trees obscured his shot, which struck 
plaintiff who was on border between fairways.244 Dispute 
existed as to whether defendant yelled “fore.”245 
Not reckless246 
Maxwell v. 
Rowe247 
Plaintiff struck by defendant’s ball. Defendant failed to yell 
“fore” and there was dispute about whether he saw plaintiff 
before shooting.248 
Reckless249 
Monk v. 
Phillips250 
Plaintiff struck after golf ball traveled at 90-degree angle 
after defendant hit it off the “toe” of his club.251 Plaintiff 
was told “look out, he’s fixing to hit,” but not to stop or 
wait.252 
Not reckless253 
Schick v. 
Ferolito254 
Defendant perceived plaintiff to be in the “line of fire,” 
waved plaintiff off in an effort to induce plaintiff to move 
from his location.255 Plaintiff did not move, or defendant did 
not wait for him to move, and defendant hit anyway.256 
Reckless257 
Gyuriak v. 
Millice258  
Defendant’s shot traveled 220 yards into neighboring 
fairway to strike plaintiff.259 Others in defendant’s foursome 
yelled “fore.”260 
Not reckless261 
 
 
 235. 559 N.E.2d 705. 
 236. Id. at 706 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id. at 709. 
 240. No. 47-94, 1995 WL 495569 (Ohio Ct. App. June 13, 1995). 
 241. Id. at *1. 
 242. Id. at *2. 
 243. 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 244. Id. at 592. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 594 (finding no duty to yell “fore,” although failure is a violation of golf etiquette). 
 247. No. 97CA0075, 1998 WL 663228 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1998). 
 248. Id. at *1 
 249. Id. at *2. 
 250. 983 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 251. Id. at 324. 
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. at 326. 
 254. 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001). 
 255. Id. at 964. 
 256. Id.  
 257. Id. at 970. 
 258. 775 N.E.2d 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 259. Id. at 393. 
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Case Conduct Ruling on 
Recklessness 
Alexander v. 
Tullis262 
Golf ball stuck plaintiff who was on fairway in a depression 
invisible to defendant.263 
Not reckless264 
Shin v. Ahn265 Defendant failed to look before teeing off.266 Ball traveled at 
45-degree angle and struck member of defendant’s 
foursome.267 
Reckless268 
Yoneda v. 
Tom269 
Plaintiff was emerging from restroom on golf course 175 
yards from defendant who hit his golf ball without yelling 
“fore.”270 
Not reckless271 
 
2. Recklessness and Awareness of Risk 
A related issue is the degree to which the defendant needs to have 
awareness of the risk posed by her actions in order to be found reckless. 
Courts have wrestled with how to distinguish mere knowledge of a risk 
from an appreciation of the severity of the risk.272 Courts have also 
wrestled with whether recklessness can be proven even in the absence of 
conscious awareness of risk on the part of a defendant.273  
 
 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at 396. 
 262. No. 2005-P-0031, 2006 WL 763088 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2006). 
 263. Id. at *1. 
 264. Id. at *3. 
 265. 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007). 
 266. Id. at 275. 
 267. Id. at 276. 
 268. Id. at 285. To be precise, the appellate court held that the plaintiff could recover under a 
simple negligence theory, since the defendant had increased the risk of harm inherent in golf by 
failing to look before taking his swing. Id. However, the court opined that the duty of a golfer “to play 
within the bounds of the game; to not intentionally injure another player or to engage in conduct ‘that 
is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in’ golf” and found 
that the defendant breached that duty. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 269. 133 P.3d 796 (Haw. 2006). 
 270. Id. at 798. 
 271. Id. at 809. 
 272. See Sergent, supra note 74, at 52. 
 273. See Catheline v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 348 F. Supp. 43, 46 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (“The 
distinction between the Restatement’s standard for wilful and wanton conduct, and the more 
restrictive rule requiring actual consciousness of probable injury, appears determinative in the case at 
bar.”). The Supreme Court recently suggested that civil recklessness includes no subjective 
knowledge requirement, see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2007), although 
that seems inconsistent with the bulk of state court jurisprudence on the subject. See, e.g., Bailey v. 
Palladino, 2006 WL 2068136, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 27, 2006) (quoting Schick v. 
Ferolito, 767 A.2d 692, 696 (N.J. 2001)) (“Recklessness, unlike negligence, requires a conscious 
choice of a course of action, with knowledge or a reason to know that it will create serious danger to 
others.”); Cohen v. 5 Brooks Stable, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (Haerle, J., 
dissenting); Boyd v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 845 N.E. 2d 356, 363 (Mass. 2006). 
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It is generally undisputed that recklessness requires some level of 
consciousness;274 what confuses courts is whether a conscious action 
without a conscious appreciation of risk will be sufficient to state such a 
claim.275 Some courts have described a defendant’s conscious awareness 
of risk as “vital” and “crucial” in establishing recklessness.276 Other courts 
have taken the middle ground: recognizing that while consciousness of 
risk is required, such consciousness can be implied or constructive, 
proven by the circumstances confronting the defendant rather than any 
direct evidence of cognitive recognition of risk.277 However, courts 
universally recognize that where conscious awareness of a risk can be 
demonstrated, establishing liability for recklessness will be far easier.278 
In one case, a court found that knowledge of a hole in a tire was not 
sufficient to establish recklessness for the sake of punitive damages where 
the defendant was not aware of the failure of steel support belts within a 
tire (something not susceptible to visual assessment).279 Similar opinions 
seem to suggest that the awareness of risk needed to prove recklessness 
must be fairly specific: awareness of a general risk is not enough for a 
finding of recklessness. 
3. Recklessness, Carefulness, and Precautions 
Commentators on recklessness have frequently suggested that the low 
cost of accident avoidance should be a factor considered in finding 
recklessness.280 Courts have explored this option, particularly in cases 
 
 
 274. See Bourgeois v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 562 So.2d 1177, 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(recklessness is “usually” accompanied by consciousness of risk, although it can be proven by facts 
that would have made a reasonable person aware of a high risk even without showing subjective 
awareness on the part of the defendant). 
 275. Id. 
 276. See, e.g., Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 530 (Del. 1987) (“the . . . crucial element 
involves the actor’s state of mind . . . . The actor’s state of mind is thus vital.”). 
 277. See, e.g., Minick v. Englert, 167 N.W.2d 551, 554 (S.D. 1969); Williamson v. McKenna, 
354 P.2d 56, 70 (Or. 1960) (“It is not necessary that [a] defendant actually know of the risk.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 278. Williamson, 354 P.2d at 71. Easy cases, of course, make bad law. See, e.g., Burnham v. 
Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 640 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); O’Bannon v. 
Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Professor Jody Armour suggests that conscious risk taking should be viewed in recklessness analysis 
as an evidentiary factor supporting recklessness, not as the tort’s core component. See Jody David 
Armour, Interpretive Construction, Systemic Consistency, and Criterial Norms in Tort Law, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1157, 1162–63 (2001). 
 279. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 118–19 (Md. 1992) (knowledge of hole not sufficient to 
establish gross negligence); Sergent, supra note 74, at 55. 
 280. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1143. 
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involving recklessness in its “gross negligence” guise. Indeed, some 
courts have made the defendant’s level of care the critical factor in 
determining whether a finding of recklessness was appropriate.281 Here, 
two further distinctions could be drawn: (1) the defendant’s actual level of 
care; and (2) the level of care appropriate under the circumstances. 
Recklessness can be identified under the first category where a defendant 
has failed to exercise even a minimal amount of care. Under the second 
category, recklessness can be found where a defendant has failed to 
exercise anything close to the level of care appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
Some courts have found that recklessness can be satisfied by a 
showing that a defendant has failed to exercise even “slight care.”282 The 
failure of a driver approaching an intersection to slow down, signal, or 
look at oncoming traffic, for example, amounts to a failure not just to do 
what a prudent person would do but rather a failure to do what even an 
imprudent or foolish person might do.283 This is another odd notion: 
Exactly what care a fool would employ is hard to judge. 
Other courts, however, have suggested that a finding of recklessness 
requires a showing of “no care.”284 Where a defendant has taken just 
minimal precautions against a risk of harm, courts are far less likely to 
render a finding of recklessness.285 
4. Recklessness and Harm 
Courts have also imposed in recklessness cases a requirement that the 
harm raised by a defendant’s conduct be extremely severe, even as the 
Restatement authors have moved away from the apparent “life and limb” 
requirements set forth in early articulations of the scope of recklessness.286 
 
 
 281. See, e.g., G.D. v. Monarch Plastic Surgery, P.A., 239 F.R.D. 641, 646 (D. Kan. 2007) (“The 
level of care (or lack thereof) taken by the defendants to protect confidential patient information 
would appear to be the appropriate measure of any alleged ‘recklessness’ on the part of the 
defendants.”). 
 282. See, e.g., Nist v. Tudor, 407 P.2d 798, 804 (Wash. 1965). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. 04-1710, 2006 WL 1231662, at *2 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Apr. 26, 2006); Cobb v. Mantua Twp. Bd. of Trs., No. 2000-P-0127, 2001 WL 1602680, at *6 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (“[W]anton conduct [is] . . . the failure to exercise any care 
whatsoever.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 285. See, e.g., Santho v. Boy Scouts of Am., 857 N.E.2d 1255, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“[I]t 
is undisputed that Bennett took certain precautions when she initiated the relay race. . . . [W]e cannot 
say that Bennett’s conduct in organizing the relay race was in reckless disregard of the safety of 
another.”). 
 286. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
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Courts have suggested that the harm a defendant’s misconduct poses must 
be “grave” in order to trigger a holding of recklessness.287 
Sandler, a recent Massachusetts Supreme Court case, is particularly 
revealing on the significance some courts assign to the level of harm 
necessary to prove recklessness.288 The case involved an injured bicyclist 
attempting to evade Massachusetts’ recreational use statute (which 
protects, among others, park operators from tort liability for mere 
negligent conduct).289 The state supreme court found no recklessness even 
though the park authority was aware of poor lighting and visibility in a 
heavily traveled tunnel along a bike path.290 The plaintiff suffered injuries 
when he fell from his bike after striking an uncovered drain hole (vandals 
had apparently removed the drain cover).291 Plaintiff introduced evidence 
that the government was aware of the dangers posed and took no 
precautions.292  
However, the court found no recklessness because the level of injury 
posed by an uncovered drainage hole in a poorly lit tunnel did not pose a 
risk of “death or grave bodily injury.”293 The risk was considered to be a 
“simple tripping hazard.”294 In a footnote, the court compared the instant 
case to cases involving victims who had been killed, maimed, and 
severely burned, leading to findings of recklessness.295 Since this victim 
had not been killed, the court concluded no recklessness was present, in 
spite of the government’s awareness of the risk and failure to take 
precautions. It is not enough that the plaintiff could have been killed—
death must have been “seen as likely.”296 
In some contexts, a requirement of grave harm makes absolutely no 
sense as a component of recklessness analysis. For example, recklessness 
 
 
 287. Spagnulo v. Commonwealth, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 728, 2006 WL 1238671, at *6 (Mass. Super. 
2006). 
 288. See Sandler v. Commonwealth, 644 N.E.2d 641 (Mass. 1995).  
 289. Id. at 642, 644. 
 290. Id. at 644–45. 
 291. Id. at 642–43. 
 292. Id. at 644. 
 293. Id. at 643, 645. This finding is questionable. A bicyclist who is thrown from her bicycle 
while traveling at speeds of 15–25 mph could easily suffer a fatal head injury. The fact that the 
plaintiff did not should not play any role in determining the ex ante expected level of harm posed by 
the uncovered drain hole. There are some 600 bicycle-related deaths due to head injuries each year. 
See BICYCLE RELATED INJURIES, http://www.ok.gov/health/documents/Bicycle_Injuries.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 294. See Spagnulo v. Commonwealth, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 728, 2006 WL 1238671, at *3 (Mass. 
Super. 2006) (discussing Sandler, 644 N.E.2d 641). 
 295. Sandler, 644 N.E.2d at 644 n.4. 
 296. Spagnulo, 2006 WL 1238671, at *3 (discussing Sandler, 644 N.E.2d 641). 
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applied as a standard for imposing liability in a partnership, corporate, or 
other fiduciary context cannot require bodily harm, or else risk losing its 
utility. It is very difficult to imagine situations in which partners might 
expose one another to death or dismemberment, yet the law sets forth 
recklessness as the standard for intra-partner disputes where conflicts of 
interest are not involved.297  
More generally, however, it is not clear what policy goal is served by 
focusing on level of harm in setting recklessness apart from negligence. A 
plaintiff’s compensatory damages in a negligence case turn on the severity 
of the injury the plaintiff suffered.298 A dismembered plaintiff can (almost 
always) recover more money than one who is just bruised and battered, 
and that greater potential liability should lead a hypothetical defendant to 
avoid exposing such victims to loss of life or limb. The operation of 
incentives in this way is the essence of the economic case for negligence. 
Why a different standard, recklessness, would serve any additional role in 
cases in which the risk of harm posed was grave is hard to fathom. 
a. Recklessness and Victims 
On a related note, courts seem far more willing to find recklessness in 
cases involving sympathetic victims. In the Massachusetts case Sandler, 
the court’s list of victims who had successfully proven recklessness 
included three young boys, a young girl, and a disabled person.299 While 
the court did not explicitly acknowledge that the sympathetic or 
vulnerable character of the victim of a tort should shape its rulings on 
recklessness, that is the clear implication. 
In other instances, courts have taken into account the vulnerability of a 
victim in allowing a plaintiff to recover for mere negligence where 
otherwise recklessness would be required.300 This is not precisely the 
same thing as taking a victim’s characteristics into account when 
analyzing recklessness, but does show that courts are influenced by victim 
 
 
 297. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404c (1997). 
 298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 & cmt. a (1979) (“[C]ompensatory damages are 
the damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by 
him. . . . They give to the injured person some pecuniary return for what he has suffered or is likely to 
suffer. There is no scale by which the detriment caused by suffering can be measured and hence there 
can be only a very rough correspondence between the amount awarded as damages and the extent of 
the suffering.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 299. Sandler, 644 N.E.2d at 644 n.4. 
 300. See, e.g., Outlaw v. Bituminous Ins. Co., 357 So.2d 1350 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (negligence 
can be recoverable where adult golfer strikes child golfer). 
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characteristics even when deciding whether to analyze recklessness in the 
first place. 
What role the victim’s characteristics should play in a coherent 
analysis of recklessness is unclear. To be sure, the level of justified risk 
exposure with respect to a sympathetic victim might be less than to an 
unsympathetic victim.301 But the justification for a risk is already part of 
negligence analysis. Perhaps a sympathetic victim suffers more substantial 
harm than an unsympathetic one, although it should have nothing to do 
with the actual magnitude of loss resulting from risky conduct. Certainly, 
the sympathetic character of a victim has nothing to do with a defendant’s 
consciousness of risk. 
5. Recklessness and Blameworthiness 
Some courts have left undefined the precise contours of recklessness, 
preferring instead to simply characterize recklessness by reference to what 
it is not (negligence or intentional tort). Typically, this approach centers 
on distinguishing recklessness from negligence by way of the greater level 
of blameworthiness associated with recklessness. 
For instance, the Illinois Supreme Court has explained that “[w]illful 
and wanton [mis]conduct carries a degree of opprobrium not found in 
merely negligent behavior”; this amounts to a “qualitative distinction.”302 
The Oregon Supreme Court has opined that the “basic ingredient” in cases 
finding recklessness is the defendant’s “I don’t care attitude.”303 
Blameworthiness has also arisen as a defining characteristic of 
recklessness in cases involving malicious behavior or bad faith. Courts 
have found it easy to find recklessness where there is bad faith,304 even if 
the other requirements of recklessness have not been established in great 
detail. 
Some courts have gone so far as to suggest that an intentional act 
which exposes another to a high risk of harm is not sufficient for a finding 
of recklessness unless it shows a sufficiently cruel nature and wicked 
intent.305  
 
 
 301. Consider, for instance, courts’ continued willingness to tolerate higher levels of risky 
conduct with respect to criminal trespassers. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 302. Poole v. City of Rolling Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768, 770 (Ill. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 303. Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 67 (Or. 1960) (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 304. See Sergent, supra note 74, at 71. 
 305. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 397 P.2d 771, 777 (Or. 1964). Oregon subsequently abrogated the 
common law interfamilial immunity that required the plaintiff in Chaffin to plead recklessness. Heino 
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IV. BEHAVIORAL, COGNITIVE AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 
In this Part, I develop the argument that the judicial confusion 
surrounding recklessness does not arise from simple linguistic 
imprecision.306 The source of the “twilight zone” status of recklessness307 
is more fundamental. Simply put, recklessness as described in black-letter 
law is not consistent with the way the human mind processes decisions in 
the face of risk and uncertainty. 
Tort law ought not to be scientifically naive.308 Law should be written 
and applied to account for the manner in which humans make decisions. A 
hundred years ago, that may not have been possible, but today, advances 
along two scientific lines, behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, 
provide new insight into how humans make decisions. These advances 
should now be incorporated into the cognitive foundations of tort law. 
Behavioral economics and neuroeconomics are two related (but 
distinct) disciplines. Each offers important contributions into why the 
structure of recklessness which the ALI constructed, and American courts 
confused, is incomplete. Behavioral economics, derived from a wealth of 
experimental research in behavioral psychology, focuses on how human 
beings actually behave.309 An important insight of behavioral economics 
is that human actors rarely comport themselves according to the rational 
risk-averse utility maximizer310 envisioned by traditional neoclassical 
economics311 (and its wayward offspring, conventional law and 
economics312). 
 
 
v. Harper, 759 P.2d 253 (Or. 1988) (en banc). See also supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 306. Certainly, there is no “magic verbal formula which will describe with precision the 
difference between negligence and reckless conduct.” Williamson, 354 P.2d at 69. 
 307. See Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (N.C. 1985). 
 308. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000) (“Despite the difficulty of the task, the law 
needs an accurate model of human judgment and choice.”). 
 309. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present & 
Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004). 
 310. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 154 
(2003). The idealized “economic person” has sometimes been referred to as homo economicus. Homo 
economicus selfishly pursues individual happiness (utility, following Mill). At the same time, she 
sensibly avoids risks that do not offer a positive expected return. See Barbara P. Billauer, The Right to 
Health—A Holistic Health Plan for the Next Administration, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 234, 269 
n.80 (2007) (“A purely rational person (also known as homo economicus) is an individual who is 
extremely individualistic, considering only those benefits and costs that directly affect him or her.”). 
 311. John B. Davis, Behavioral Economics, Neuroeconomics and Identity, in ECONOMICS & THE 
MIND 58 (Barbara Montero & Mark D. White eds., 2007). 
 312. Behavioral law and economics has become a popular school in American legal scholarship, 
drawing on the insights of behavioral economics. See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 309, at 36. 
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By contrast, neuroeconomics,313 based on recent advances in the 
understanding of the actual cognitive processes at work in human thought, 
focuses on choice as a product of brain activity.314 Neuroeconomics is 
“the study of how the embodied brain interacts with its external 
environment to produce economic behavior.”315 Neuroeconomics exploits 
recent developments in brain imaging technology to investigate 
systematically how brain function causes certain behaviors.316 
Neuroeconomics contributes to behavioral economics in that it offers a 
neurobiological basis for some of the departures from rational action 
experimentally observed by Behavioralists.317 
A. Bevioralism, Heuristics and Recklessness 
Behavioral law and economics has its origins in a series of famous 
experiments318 by Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman and the late 
Amos Twersky, along with similar work by economist Richard Thaler.319 
These experiments built a foundation for later work; collectively, the 
result has been to paint a picture of human decision making quite different 
from the rational utility maximization presumed by neoclassical 
economics.320  
These experiments have demonstrated that real-world humans differ in 
several ways from the rational decision-making units postulated by 
neoclassical economics. They are, for instance, more altruistic, fairness-
 
 
 313. Neuroeconomics is perhaps best understood as “the combination of neuroscience and 
behavioral economics” and a “strategy for grounding the behavioral regularities that cognitive science 
has established in brain structures.” Davis, supra note 311, at 67; see generally Peter Coy, Why Logic 
Often Takes a Backseat; The Study of Neuroeconomics May Topple the Notion of Rational Decision-
making, BUS. WK., Mar. 28, 2005, at 94. 
 314. ECONOMICS & THE MIND, supra note 311, at 1 (behavioral “economists have tended to . . . 
tak[e] an extreme behaviorist orientation and [have] neglect[ed] the role of the mind entirely.”).  
 315. Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 44 (2005). 
“Economics,” in this sense, has nothing to do with money (or at least, need not have anything to do 
with money). Instead, it is simply decision making in the face of budget constraints. 
 316. Davis, supra note 311, at 67; Kevin McCabe et al., Lessons from Neuroeconomics for the 
Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 68 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith 
eds., 2005); Chorvat et al., supra note 315, at 44. 
 317. Erin Ann O’Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, in LAW & THE BRAIN 21, 25 
(Semir Zeki & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2004).  
 318. Experiments were important in the development of the field because “experimental control is 
exceptionally helpful for distinguishing behavioral explanations from standard ones.” Camerer & 
Loewenstein, supra note 309, at 7. 
 319. Id. at 6. 
 320. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1471 (1998). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] THE WRECKAGE OF RECKLESSNESS 155 
 
 
 
 
sensitive, and loss-averse.321 Further, they are more likely than 
neoclassical economists assumed to discount future costs and benefits.322 
Scholars have argued that these decision-making “errors” result from the 
application of heuristics323: decision-making “short-cuts” designed to 
reduce the costs associated with complex choice.324 In addition, scholars 
have found systematic errors in subjects ability to estimate 
probabilities.325  
Behavioralism’s insights into human decision making should change 
our view of the black-letter law of recklessness because they call into 
question the degree to which we are capable of consciously disregarding 
known risks.326 Indeed, behavioralism may undercut the validity of the 
concept of “known risk” entirely.327 
1. Over-Optimism Bias 
Recklessness requires inquiry into a defendant’s subjective calculation 
of the probability of an unfortunate result, or at least into the level of risk 
a prudent person would appreciate if in possession of the defendant’s 
knowledge of the facts prior to an accident. To be reckless, a defendant 
must proceed indifferent either to a specific awareness of a substantial 
risk, or to awareness of facts that would make a sensible person appreciate 
such a risk.328 The manner in which we estimate probabilities, therefore, is 
an essential component of any theory of recklessness. Behavioral science 
has revealed that even where we appreciate the actual probability of an 
unfortunate event, we tend to underestimate the probability that it will 
happen to us in particular, due to our tendency to be overly optimistic.329 
 
 
 321. See generally Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 309, at 15–21. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive 
Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1476 (2006). 
 324. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1085 (2000). Heuristics 
serve a useful purpose because most complex decisions involve a greater expenditure of cognitive 
energy than decision makers are willing to allocate. See Rachlinski, supra note 308, at 758. 
 325. Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for Tort and 
Contract Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 316, at 456. 
 326. For a strong critique of the application of behavioral psychology to legal scholarship, see 
generally Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the 
New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002). 
 327. The concept of deliberation underlies the modern notion of culpability in both tort and 
crime. See Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive Model of the Development 
of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1267 (1990). 
 328. See supra Part II.B. 
 329. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 324, at 1091; McCann, supra note 323, at 1460. Over-
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Over-optimism is a highly robust330 example of bounded rationality 
and judgment error.331 More than 250 studies have documented that 
people believe negative events are less likely to happen to them than to 
others.332 For instance, a study has demonstrated that smokers believe that 
they individually are less likely “than the average smoker to suffer health 
problems as a result of smoking.”333 Interestingly, risk calculations are not 
constant across levels of risk. Humans tend to overestimate the risks of 
low probability events (such as a terrorist attack), but underestimate the 
risks of high probability events (such as the adverse health outcomes 
associated with consumption of red meat).334  
Over-optimism calls into question the ability of human actors to 
appreciate consciously substantial risks with any degree of certainty and 
precision. An actor may engage in risky conduct, and may even fully 
appreciate the base level of risk such conduct poses. At the same time, 
behavioral economics’ demonstration of persistent and pervasive over-
optimism suggests that such actors may underestimate the probability that 
they in particular will experience an unfortunate outcome. To the extent 
that we hold an actor who appreciates a substantial risk liable for 
recklessness, we may be applying an unrealistic standard; that is, one that 
is higher than median for the relevant population. Actors may appreciate 
risks yet believe (irrationally) that they will be fortunate enough to avoid 
them.  
Nor does the supposedly objective component of recklessness analysis 
save the concept. Virtually all people (thus all reasonable people) suffer 
from over-optimism bias. Awareness of facts that a prudent person might 
recognize as indicators of substantial risk is a flawed measure, since risk 
evaluation, looking in from the outside, differs in a scientifically 
demonstrable and predictable way from risk evaluation from the inside. 
The drunk-driving example discussed earlier is probably the best 
example of over-optimism bias at work. Thanks to public education 
campaigns and criminal enforcement, the risks associated with drunk 
 
 
optimism may be desirable and adaptive because it makes people happier, more content, and increases 
their productivity. Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 316, at 268, 271. 
 330. Jolls, supra note 329, at 277.  
 331. Id. at 270.  
 332. Id. 
 333. Ole-Jørgen Skog, Addiction, Choice, and Irrationality, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 316, at 111, 122. 
 334. See W. Kip Viscusi, Judging Risk and Recklessness, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW DO 
JURIES DECIDE?, 171, 182, 183 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002). 
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driving may be well known. Seventy-two percent of adult Americans 
report serving as or relying on designated drivers.335 Americans seem to 
know that getting behind the wheel increases the chances they will be 
involved in a crash by many times (even if it may not make an accident 
probable). Yet they regularly drive after consuming too many drinks.336 
Even though they know the overall level of risk, drivers believe that they 
are going to be one of the lucky ones. This over-optimism sometimes has 
tragic results. 
This is not to say that we are incapable of appreciating risk. Not just 
recklessness but both intentional tort (in its substantial certainty form) and 
negligence assume that human actors (subjectively or objectively) can 
appreciate risk and conform their conduct to a safe standard.337 To a large 
extent the gross ability of human actors to assess risk is a presupposition 
of all law. But over-optimism does call into question our ability to 
measure risk accurately or precisely. Therefore, employing standards that 
require drawing fine lines between negligence, recklessness, and 
intentional tort is unwise, and perhaps unfair given the demonstrated 
inability of the model human to make precise probability estimates that 
such clear distinctions require. 
2. Availability 
A second behavioral trait relevant to recklessness is the so-called 
availability heuristic, which also has a profound effect on probability 
estimates. Availability is a well-known example of judgment error which 
describes how “the ease with which a given event comes to individuals’ 
minds” influences “probability estimates.”338  
Availability posits that the more “available” a particular event or 
occurrence is to an actor, the more heavily that event will weigh in the 
actor’s assessments of probability: “[T]he perceptions of boundedly 
rational actors about probabilities of uncertain events are heavily 
influenced by how available other instances of the event in question 
are.”339 Recurrent incidents are overweighed in most decision makers’ 
 
 
 335. NIELSON RESEARCH, DESIGNATED DRIVING STUDY, available at http://www.alcoholstats. 
com/mm/docs/5116.doc (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
 336. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 337. This is the case even where the law does not require a showing that a particular defendant 
could appreciate risk and conform to a safe approach in order to trigger liability. 
 338. Jolls, supra note 329, at 271; see also Jolls et al., supra note 314, at 1518. 
 339. Jolls, supra note 329, at 271.  
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calculations of expected outcomes.340 By the same token, people are likely 
to underestimate the likelihood of low-probability events—even ones 
posing significant harm—due to this heuristic.341  
For many actors, availability, like over-optimism, may lead to 
significant underestimation of the level of risk particular conduct poses, 
even where such conduct might lead to legal liability for recklessness. 
Many of the circumstances in which courts render findings of recklessness 
are freak or strange occurrences—like the golf ball that shoots out at an 
unpredictable angle and strikes a fellow golfer in a sensitive area (most 
commonly the eye). Courts, ex post, have no problem saying that such 
freak occurrences were nevertheless the product of conscious indifference 
to known risks. But ex ante, the actors involved may not have appreciated 
the likely risk of harm where examples of those bad outcomes score low 
on the availability scale. Events that have not occurred to a particular 
actor before, or that occurred a long time ago or in other contexts, are not 
available and are not easily incorporated into probability determinations. 
By contrast, more available events—particularly more recent events—
weigh more heavily. Consider, for instance, a driver who repeatedly 
drives in her car while sending text messages from a cell phone or e-mails 
from a personal digital assistant. Objectively, we might be able to say that 
such conduct is incredibly risky.342 But when an individual assesses the 
risk of this practice, the available memories of her previous texting-while-
driving activity (which did not lead to an accident) may cloud her ability 
to appreciate that substantial risk consciously. 
Availability influences probability unconsciously, or at least at the 
borders of consciousness. Few actors are aware that they are employing a 
short-cut heuristic in making decisions in the face of risk. A legal standard 
tied to distinguishing conscious probability evaluations from unconscious 
ones imposes on courts an unreasonable burden. Unconscious heuristics 
interfere with conscious probability calculations, leaving individual 
decision making a product of both conscious and unconscious risk. 
Asking courts to label an actor’s conduct as one or the other is unfair and 
unwise. 
 
 
 340. Thomas S. Ulen, Human Fallibility and the Forms of Law: The Case of Traffic Safety, in 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 316, at 397, 407. 
 341. See Jolls et al., supra note 320, at 1519. 
 342. Washington State has recently outlawed the practice in recognition of this risk. See Paul 
McNamara, State bans texting while driving, http://www.networkworld.com/community/?q=node/ 
15088 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] THE WRECKAGE OF RECKLESSNESS 159 
 
 
 
 
3. Hindsight Bias and Judicial Calculations 
The availability heuristic contributes to undermining the legal concept 
of recklessness in another way. Here, it is not the bias of the purportedly 
reckless actor that matters, but rather the bias of the ex post decision 
maker seeking to determine whether the level of risk an actor’s conduct 
posed was sufficiently high or substantial to trigger a finding of 
recklessness.343 
The tendency of the human mind to fixate on the available leads to 
hindsight bias, one of the most studied shortcomings in human beings’ 
probability assessments.344 Humans find it easier to imagine events “that 
actually occurred” rather than events “that did not,” leading to 
overestimates of the probabilities of events that actually did occur.345 
Thus, hindsight bias describes a “tendency of actors to overestimate the ex 
ante prediction that they had concerning the likelihood of an event’s 
occurring after learning that it actually did occur.”346 Juries are “likely to 
believe precautions that could have been taken would have been more cost 
effective than they actually appeared to be ex ante.”347 As a result,  
Hindsight bias will lead juries . . . to find defendants liable more 
frequently than if cost-benefit analysis were done correctly—that is, 
on an ex ante basis. Thus, plaintiffs will win cases they deserve to 
lose. This prediction is consistent with the frequently expressed 
(though difficult to verify) view that the tort system imposes too 
much liability.348 
Studies support the suggestion that hindsight bias plays a role in 
judges’ and juries’ calculations of risk probabilities. Juries have been 
 
 
 343. See supra Part III.B.1. The availability bias and the hindsight bias lead to exactly the 
opposite result with respect to probability determinations. Availability leads to underestimation of risk 
ex ante; hindsight bias leads to overestimation of risk ex post. The difference between the two has to 
do with who is falling victim to the bias. Availability bias affects the actor embarking on a risky 
course, while hindsight bias affects the fact-finder evaluating the actor’s conduct after the fact. 
 344. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 324, at 1095. 
 345. Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 309, at 10. 
 346. Ulen, supra note 340, at 410.  
 347. Id. at 412. 
 348. Jolls et al., supra note 320, at 1524. The probability that a McDonald’s patron would suffer 
severe, debilitating burns from a cup of scalding hot coffee, for instance, can hardly be said to be 
substantial or even high ex ante. Yet a jury had no trouble finding that McDonald’s had acted 
recklessly in that famous case. See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 
1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994). 
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shown to grossly overestimate the probabilities of low-probability 
events.349 
Recklessness requires the actor to have been aware of a risk, or of facts 
that raised such a risk, and requires that the risk be fairly substantial. But 
the jury or judge deciding whether the risk was substantial is not engaging 
in the same analysis as the actor. An important, salient, and available 
event—the accident itself—has occurred in the time since the actor 
embarked on a supposedly reckless course of conduct. Expecting juries 
and judges to overcome their own hindsight bias is demonstrably 
unscientific. 
The effect of hindsight bias is not limited to analysis of recklessness. 
In negligence determinations as well, courts and juries applying the “Hand 
Formula”350 to determining the appropriate level of risk and precaution are 
likely to overestimate the probabilities of harmful results based on the fact 
that such results actually occurred.351 But the effects of hindsight bias are 
likely to be particularly potent in analyses of recklessness. Whereas 
negligence merely requires balancing the probability of a harmful result, 
the severity of harm, and the costs of accident avoidance, recklessness 
adds an additional requirement: that the probability of harm be substantial. 
Finders of fact tasked with determining whether a particular risk was 
substantial prior to an accident are far more likely to reach an affirmative 
conclusion because the harmful result actually occurred. 
Augmenting the effect of hindsight bias is the “denominator blindness” 
effect identified by Kip Viscusi and Richard Zeckhauser.352 Their research 
reveals that, in calculating the “risk” of an accident, people tend to focus 
only on the “number of adverse outcomes,” rather than on the more 
 
 
 349. See Viscusi, supra note 334, at 185. 
 350. According to this formula, named after Judge Learned Hand (who articulated the ideas 
expressed in the formula in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)), a 
“reasonable” and therefore non-negligent actor takes precautions when the benefit of those 
precautions in terms of reduced accident likelihood or severity outweighs the costs of taking such 
precaution. If B is the burden of precautions, and P is the probability of an unfortunate outcome of 
magnitude L, a reasonable person takes all precautions for which B<P * L. Due to the increasing 
marginal cost of further “levels” of precaution and the diminishing returns associated with further 
precaution, at some point a reasonable person does not take further steps to avoid an accident because 
of the low value those steps would have. Judge Posner describes the Hand Formula as involving 
“determining whether the burden of precaution is less than the magnitude of the accident, if it occurs, 
multiplied by the probability of occurrence.” McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc. 826 F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th 
Cir. 1987). The formula is analytically precise but not operationally precise because juries are rarely 
given sufficient information to insert values into the formula. 
 351. Jolls et al., supra note 320, at 1523–25; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 324, at 1096; Ronen 
Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 16 n.56, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1021547). 
 352. Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 75. 
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accurate “number of adverse outcomes” divided by the number of 
potential adverse outcomes (which the authors describe as a defendant’s 
“exposure” to adverse outcomes).353 Since juries and judges tend to ignore 
the denominator in this more accurate measure of risk, they may be prone 
systematically to find recklessness in evaluating larger-scale operations.354 
Even if such operations are characterized by a lower rate of serious 
accidents, the large scale may mean a larger number of accidents and thus 
a larger numerator.355 
Courts are particularly unlikely to be able to overcome hindsight bias 
and the denominator effect where an accident leading to a claim of 
recklessness had been preceded by other similar unfortunate incidents, no 
matter how improbable those incidents may have been. In fact, many 
courts explicitly acknowledge the role that previous prior incidents play in 
leading to findings of recklessness.356 While previous incidents can rightly 
play a role by suggesting a defendant’s knowledge of facts involving the 
risk, they also enhance the prospect that a court will overestimate the risk 
that a course of conduct actually posed at the time the defendant 
undertook it. 
B. Neuroeconomics and Recklessness 
Neurobiology is a field that has seen dramatic advances in the last 
quarter century. These advances include both improved technology 
capacity for imaging and measuring the function of the brain,357 and a 
reconceptualization of the study of the mind that recognizes that particular 
 
 
 353. Id. at 75–76. 
 354. Id. at 88. 
 355. Id. at 77–78. 
 356. See Sergent, supra note 74, at 69; see, e.g., Featherstone v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. 04-1710, 2006 
WL 1231662, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2006) (fact of only one prior accident defeats claim of 
recklessness). 
 357. Significant advances in this area include “non-intrusive methods for . . . locating brain 
activity” such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), techniques for measuring and localizing brain reactions and brain electrical activity such as 
electroencephalogram (EEG) and magnetoencephalogram (MEG), and neurochemical studies of the 
brain. Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative Judgment in 
Law and Justice, in LAW & THE BRAIN, supra note 317, at 77, 89, 90; see also Paul J. Zak, 
Neuroeconomics, in LAW & THE BRAIN, supra note 317, at 133, 138–40. Of these, brain imaging is 
currently the most popular technique. See Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 12. In controlled 
experiments, groups of people are asked to perform sets of tasks (some “control” and some 
“treatment”), and while they are performing those tasks, images are recorded of their brains. Id. 
Comparisons of the two sets of images reveal which portions of the brain are activated by the different 
behaviors. Id. While it has led to a number of interesting findings, brain imaging remains “only a 
crude snapshot.” Id.  
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human thoughts, tendencies, and behaviors can be isolated to particular 
parts and processes of the brain.358 Microeconomics, at its core the study 
of decision making under resource constraints,359 has cultivated these 
neurobiological advances into the burgeoning field of neuroeconomics.360 
These developments are only now resonating in the study of the law.361 
Neuroscience has the potential to open up the “black box” of human 
cognition.362 As law professor Oliver Goodenough and neurobiologist 
Kristin Prehn explain, some  
traditional psychology, at the behaviourist extreme, was left with a 
mysterious ‘black box’ as the explanation for the central part of 
th[e] chain [connecting sensory “input” to behavioral “output”] 
. . . . By untangling human brain function itself and relating it to the 
processes of sensation, thought and action under study, we can 
offer much more complete and competent descriptions and 
explanations of human psychology.363 
Goodenough and Prehn compare preneuroscientific study of human 
behavior to the development of automobile engineering without ever 
opening a car’s hood.364 Without the ability to see under the hood, such an 
exploration would “rely on explanations such as ‘the car’s desire to move 
 
 
 358. Semir Zeki & Oliver R. Goodenough, Introduction to LAW & THE BRAIN, supra note 317, at 
xi, xi–xii. 
 359. See Zak, supra note 357, at 133.  
 360. The field of neuroeconomics evolved in part as a result of the need of experimental and 
behavioral economists, on the one hand, for a neural explanation for the behavioral patterns they 
observed, and a need by neuroscientists interested in studying decision making for a theory of choice. 
See PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY & THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF 
NEUROECONOMICS 321–22 (2003). 
 361. Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic Path of the Law, in LAW & THE BRAIN, supra note 
317, at 3; Zak, supra note 357, at 134. One reason for the slow incorporation of neuroeconomic 
concepts into legal scholarship may have to do with the fact that neurobiology’s early legal champions 
also tended to advocate the relevance of evolutionary biology to the law. See O’Hara, supra note 317, 
at 27. For a detailed critique of efforts to introduce evolutionary biological theories into legal 
scholarship, see generally Brian Leiter & Michael Weisberg, Why Evolutionary Biology is (So Far) 
Irrelevant to Law (Univ. of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 89, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892881. Although evolutionary biology is not yet 
at a stage where it can offer accurate predictions of human behavior, neuroscience can contribute to 
legal reasoning without any reference to evolutionary biology. See O’Hara, supra note 317, at 27. It 
does not matter how or why particular brain structures developed. The fact is, they are now thus, and 
any consideration of how deviant or reckless behavior arises should start with a consideration of this 
reality. See id. Moreover, neuroscience is one of the rare areas where scientific knowledge has 
advanced to the point that biology can meaningfully explain behavior. See Leiter & Weisberg, supra, 
at 35–36. 
 362. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 9–10. 
 363. Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 357, at 84–85.  
 364. Id. at 85. 
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inspires its motive force.’”365 The exposure of the engine, like 
neuroscientific inquiry into brain function, makes possible a far more 
complete understanding.366  
Of course, much work remains to be done.367 But preliminary efforts 
have yielded several valuable insights which help call into question the 
black-letter law articulation of recklessness. Specifically, these lessons 
indicate that the law’s presumption that decision making can be 
categorized neatly into “conscious” or “unconscious” risk taking is 
inaccurate as a positive description of cognitive function.368 
1. Automation and Consciousness 
Early thinking about the brain, originating with French philosopher 
René Descartes, divided human behavior into two categories: behaviors 
representing simple motor responses to applied stimuli, and complex 
behaviors representing a higher order decision-making process.369 To a 
large degree, this dichotomy is embedded within the legal definition of 
tortious recklessness, which suggests that courts ought to distinguish 
between conscious indifference (rising to the level of recklessness) and 
something less conscious (which might lead only to negligence). Modern 
neurobiology built a wealth of evidence to suggest that this division is a 
false one.370  
Instead, even what appears to be a simple or reflexive behavior is 
actually the result of the same process as more complex decision making. 
Judge Morris Hoffman explains: 
Perhaps the brain—both in its ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ activities—is 
a probability machine rather than some contraption that 
inexplicably switches back and forth between reflexive/determinate 
outcomes (burn your hand, pull it back) and 
 
 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See GLIMCHER, supra note 360, at 322 (“Building a complete neuroeconomic theory of the 
brain is an enormous, and largely empirical, task.”). 
 368. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 269, 272 (2002) (“[M]odern neuroscientific research has revealed a far more fluid and 
dynamic relationship between conscious and unconscious processes. If such fluidity exists, human 
behavior is not always conscious or voluntary in the ‘either/or’ way that the voluntary act requirement 
presumes. Rather, consciousness manifests itself in degrees that represent varying levels of 
awareness.”) (footnote omitted). 
 369. Hoffman, supra note 361, at 11; GLIMCHER, supra note 360, at 268. 
 370. Hoffman, supra note 361, at 12; Denno, supra note 368, at 274; DON ROSS, ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE: MICROEXPLANATION 323 (2005). 
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cognitive/indeterminate outcomes (you decide you will walk home 
today rather than take the bus). Perhaps all behaviours are 
represented in the brain by a set of probability distributions, which 
are then continuously influenced by the interaction between 
ultimate causes (the initial probabilities that evolution built into 
brains) and proximate causes (the particular environmental 
challenges brains are called upon to solve).371 
A key finding of neuroscience is that much of brain functioning is 
“automatic,” with an individual largely unaware of the brain’s activity.372 
Neuroscience has documented 
the ability for the brain to ‘automate’ processes that had previously 
required conscious thought, thereby conserving cognitive resources. 
The idea is that if there is a behaviour that we commonly perform, 
we simply begin to perform the action without much thought. In 
fact, the brain is continually ‘automating’ much of our behavior.373 
This is because the brain, like an economist, tries to maximize benefit 
at minimum cost. In the neuro-world, the cost of conscious deliberation is 
measured in terms of the cognitive resources depleted;374 the benefit in 
terms of the quality of the decision produced.375 We may initially make 
conscious decisions when engaged in new activities, but with time we 
“automate” those decisions—that is, we make them “without thinking.”376 
Automative processes are designed “to keep behavior ‘off-line’ and below 
consciousness.”377 Such automation conserves cognitive resources 
because “conscious processing is apparently more costly than unconscious 
processing.”378 Automatic processes are faster and require little effort.379 
This means that often, “the brain’s processing occurs outside of our 
conscious awareness, making correction of some phenomena difficult.”380 
 
 
 371. Hoffman, supra note 361, at 13. 
 372. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 11. 
 373. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, The Brain and the Law, in LAW & THE BRAIN, supra 
note 317, at 113, 122–23 (citations omitted).  
 374. Id. at 123; O’Hara, supra note 317, at 25; Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, 
Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1235, 1248–49 (2005). 
 375. More precisely, the benefit of a cognitive process is the perceived quality of the decision or 
outcome. 
 376. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 373, at 122–23 (citations omitted). 
 377. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 11. 
 378. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 373, at 123. 
 379. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 16. 
 380. O’Hara, supra note 317, at 25 (citations omitted). 
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By contrast to these automatic processes, controlled processes tend to 
be associated with a subjective feeling of effort, with the individual able 
to recall the steps she went through in reaching a decision.381 Neuro-
imaging has revealed rough locations in the brain in which controlled, as 
opposed to automatic processes, occur. Controlled processes occur mostly 
in the front part of the brain, especially in the prefrontal cortex.382 
Automatic processes are concentrated in the back, top, and side parts of 
the brain.383  
Many behaviors that result from the interplay between the brain’s 
automatic and controlled processes are “routinely and falsely interpreted 
as being the product of cognitive deliberation alone.”384 In fact, the 
“default mode of brain operation” is the automatic process.385 Controlled 
processes are triggered only at “special moments when automatic 
processes become ‘interrupted,’ which happens when a person encounters 
unexpected events, experiences strong visceral states, or is presented with 
some kind of explicit challenge in the form of a novel decision or other 
type of problem.”386 In most other scenarios, there is a large degree of 
interplay between the automatic and the controlled processes.387 
Automatic and controlled processes both play a role when an 
individual faces a risky decision. On the one hand, controlled processes 
may be triggered to produce explicit evaluations of outcome 
probabilities.388 On the other hand, automatic processes generate implicit 
judgments and influence choice.389 Moreover, the brain is designed to 
respond to “changes in . . . risk rather than to their absolute levels.”390 
Thus, even where a course of conduct poses an absolute level of risk that 
is substantial, the brain may not process it as such unless there has been a 
recent change in the level of risk.391 
 
 
 381. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 16. 
 382. Id. at 17. The prefrontal cortex is the “executive” region of the brain, which draws inputs 
from other sections of the brain and integrates them. Id.  
 383. Id.  
 384. Id. at 11. 
 385. Id. at 18; Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 373, at 115. 
 386. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 18. 
 387. Denno, supra note 368, at 312. 
 388. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 50. 
 389. Id.  
 390. O’Hara, supra note 317, at 25. 
 391. Essentially, the brain “tunes out” a base level of risk. Consider, for instance, a stock car 
diver who circles a track at 180 miles per hour. Even during a warm-up lap, the driver is engaged in 
activity that involves an extremely high level of risk. Yet only unexpected changes in risk level are 
likely to activate conscious processes—a blown tire, a collision, and the like. 
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Recklessness does not leave room for the automated decision maker. It 
assumes that humans deliberate in the face of substantial risk, and 
imposes special liability where they have chosen the wrong course. 
Neuroeconomics suggests that in many instances, behaviors flow not from 
conscious choice, but from unconscious choice. Moreover, recklessness 
measures absolute levels of risk while the brain’s conscious response is 
triggered only by changes in risk level. Thus, where an actor has acted 
unconsciously, it may not be proper to label the actor’s conduct reckless. 
Similarly, a holding of recklessness may be neurobiologically unfair 
where the actor has failed to respond to a level of risk that is absolutely 
high but that has remained static over the relevant time. 
I do not mean to assert that the human brain is not capable of 
consciousness. Most neuroscientists are wary of wading into such a 
weighty question.392 However, it is fair to say that a theory of 
consciousness or free will is simply not necessary in a neuroeconomic 
approach.393 Recklessness may be inconsistent with neuroeconomics, in 
that it makes consciousness far more central in evaluating conduct than 
the brain does when making decisions.394 
2. Deception and Self-Deception 
In addition, neuroscience has uncovered evidence indicating a high 
tendency towards self-deception by the human brain, which may help 
explain, in part, the over-optimism demonstrated by behavioral scientists. 
A number of recent neuroscientific and psychological studies have 
explored the contours of deception and self-deception.395 Someday, 
 
 
 392. See, e.g., GLIMCHER, supra note 360, at 342. 
 393. Id. (“Some philosophers and scientists have argued that consciousness is a causal force 
linked closely to the concept of free will. The whole neuroeconomic approach argues against this 
conceptualization because free will, or any nonphysical process held responsible for behavioral 
indeterminacy, is not required by the neuroeconomic approach.”). 
 394. In a bizarre future world, see MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 2002), 
neuroscience might evolve to the point where individuals’ brains could be measured at the time a 
decision is made, such that ex post evaluations of whether conscious or unconscious processes were at 
work could be drawn. Even more useful for accident reconstruction purposes would be a sort of 
“cognitive black box,” like an airplane flight recorder, that measured neural activity and could be 
utilized to unravel the pre-accident mental processes a defendant employed. Either would require, 
unrealistically, that every citizen be “wired” for measurement, since we never know when a person 
might engage in risky behavior that causes an accident. It is not likely that our political system would 
ever consider such an approach, and in any event, technology has not yet reached the necessary stage 
for such precise determination. 
 395. See generally Zubair Moomol & Stephanus Petrus Henzi, The Evolutionary Psychology of 
Deception and Self-Deception, 30 S. AFR. J. PSYCHOL. 45 (2000). 
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neuroscience may be able to aid the law in helping to “sort[] deception 
from self-deception.”396 When a defendant’s mental state is disputed,  
[T]he defendant claims that he did not intend to harm or that he was 
unaware of the consequences of his actions, and the legal decision-
maker must determine whether his claim is credible. In many 
situations, the judge or jury must effectively determine whether the 
defendant is attempting to deceive them about his intentions or 
knowledge. This finding might in turn depend on a determination 
about whether the defendant, whose position is clearly 
unreasonable, is engaging in deceptive or self-deceptive claims. . . . 
[Neurobiology suggests] that the telltale physiological signs of 
deception can be suppressed only if the actor himself is unaware of 
his deceptive behavior.397 
At this point, neurobiology has simply documented the robustness of self-
deception and identified it as being correlated with certain portions of the 
brain. 
If one is “unaware of self-deception,” then characterizing an actor as 
consciously aware of his actions is awkward.398 The defendant “may be 
negligent for failing to comprehend that he was deceiving himself, but he 
cannot be said to have acted knowingly or intentionally,” or, by the same 
token, recklessly.399 Neuroscience, to date, has not developed a reliable 
way to distinguish deception from self-deception.400 This leaves judges 
and juries forced to “make their determinations about the defendant’s state 
of mind based on a ‘gut instinct’ that may be infected by unfortunate 
biases or prejudices.”401 
The point here is not that all reckless actors have deceived themselves 
about the risk associated with a course of conduct. Some may have. The 
larger point is that courts and juries are unlikely to be able to distinguish 
the actor who was conscious of a risk from the actor who was not because 
of the operation of self-deception. Placing so much emphasis in the 
doctrine of recklessness on conscious awareness of risk may draw too 
much attention by legal decision makers to something that they are simply 
not qualified to gauge. 
 
 
 396. O’Hara, supra note 317, at 28. 
 397. Id. at 29. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. 
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3. Emotion, Risk and Intuition 
Recklessness is cold. It involves indifference to risk. Not caring about 
the consequences of one’s actions towards others is at the core of many 
courts’ decisions to impose liability for recklessness. In fact, however, 
intuitive or emotional factors that have no place in the black-letter 
definition of recklessness shape many decisions in the face of risk. 
The standard account of human decision making, reflected in the law’s 
articulation of the recklessness standard, is that decisions follow 
deliberation.402 As indicated above, many decisions flow from automatic 
processes.403 In addition to automation, a second way in which the brain 
differs from the standard “conscious mind” depiction involves the role of 
emotion in shaping decisions. 
Neuroscience has revealed that emotions provide important guidance 
in human decision making.404 Emotions are particularly activated when a 
decision maker faces “incomplete information, risk, or choice in a social 
context.”405 While humans do attempt to apply controlled processes to 
evaluating risk and uncertainty, people also react to risks on an emotional 
level and such reactions can have a major effect on behavior.406 A 
growing body of empirical literature indicates that emotions play a critical 
role in “apprehension of personal and societal dangers.”407 
Researchers have used brain imaging technology to measure the brains 
of experimental subjects exposed to ambiguity and risk.408 Ambiguity 
tended to produce higher brain activity in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex,409 an area of the brain thought to be associated with emotional 
response.410 
The point here is that ambiguous situations may lead to emotional 
responses, and choices in such situations may be motivated more by 
emotion and less by consciousness.411 Current thinking in neuroscience, 
 
 
 402. George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, in ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 309, at 689, 695. There is, in fact, very little evidence to 
support this standard depiction of decision making. See id. 
 403. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 404. Zak, supra note 357, at 143. 
 405. Id.  
 406. Camerer et al., supra note 45, at 47. 
 407. See Daniel M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962520). 
 408. Under risk, the likelihoods of alternative outcomes are fully known. Under ambiguity, the 
likelihoods are unknown. McCabe et al., supra note 316, at 79. 
 409. Chorvat et al., supra note 315, at 53. 
 410. Chorvat & McCabe, supra note 373, at 115. 
 411. In a forthcoming article, Dan Kahan challenges the dichotomy between emotion and rational 
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such as the “social intuitionist model,” argue that “fast, automatic and 
affective intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments” and that 
“conscious deliberations play only a minor causal role and are used 
principally to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have 
already occurred.”412 
A person facing a highly risky situation where there remains some 
ambiguity as to the actual level of risk may be making decisions as a 
result of emotion, rather than consciousness. This is perhaps easiest to 
imagine in the emotionally laden arena of competitive contact sports. Why 
did the two kids slam another competitor into the walls of the hockey 
rink?413 Did they consciously disregard the risk, or were they simply 
responding intuitively, in the heat of the moment, to the presence of a 
highly desired puck? Recklessness requires distinguishing the emotional 
and intuitive actor from the deliberative one, but courts may be unable to 
do so. 
4. Adult and Adolescent Brains 
Science has taught us a great deal about the development of the brain 
during the course of the human life. One type of person regularly engages 
in the kind of behavior recklessness imagines: the adolescent. Adolescents 
take risks adults avoid.414 Adolescents, unlike adults, may not be able to 
think clearly about the possible consequences of their actions, even where 
they recognize the risk involved.415  
An explanation for adolescent recklessness can be found in the biology 
of the brain. The adolescent brain is not yet fully developed. The old 
notion that the brain is fully mature at age three is a myth.416 Instead, 
along a whole host of dimensions,417 adolescent brains continue to grow 
 
 
choice, arguing that emotions provide a “perceptive faculty uniquely suited to discerning what stance 
toward risk best coheres with a person’s values.” Kahan, supra note 407, at 3. While I am sympathetic 
to the argument that emotion can help make rational decisions, I hesitate to embrace the notion that 
emotionally driven actions are the consequence of “conscious deliberation” as imagined by 
recklessness doctrine. 
 412. Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 357, at 90–91. 
 413. See supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text. 
 414. Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of Consequentialist Thought: 
Evidence from Neuroscience, in LAW & THE BRAIN, supra note 317, at 245, 254.  
 415. Sedra Spano, Adolescent Brain Development, YOUTH STUD. AUSTL., Mar. 2003, at 36, 38. 
 416. Baird & Fugelsang, supra note 414, at 251. 
 417. During adolescence, the brain over produces gray matter, and then undergoes a “pruning” 
process “where connections among neurons in the brain that are not used wither away.” Spano, supra 
note 415, at 36–37. 
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well into the teenage years. The brain’s frontal lobes,418 in particular the 
prefrontal cortex, undergo significant transformation during 
adolescence,419 developing the biological prerequisites for regulating 
impulses.420 Yet it is the frontal lobes that play a critical executive role in 
deliberative processes and, at times, in risk evaluation.421 Until this 
executive function develops, young people may know of a risk but be 
unable to control their impulses. 
The brain changes with age. While consciously disregarding known 
risks may be something adolescents regularly do, brain structures change 
by adulthood. For adults, the fully developed brain should equip them to 
avoid identified risks, rather than consciously confront them. For adults, 
risks are likely either unappreciated (in which case only negligence would 
be appropriate), or they are sufficiently appreciated that intentional tort’s 
“substantial certainty” standard would encompass conduct disregarding 
such risks. The only actors for whom “conscious disregard of risk” is 
really accurate in a descriptive sense is likely teenagers! 
V. MOVING FORWARD 
Despites its lengthy history, recklessness has never proven amenable to 
an accurate and cohesive doctrinal articulation. The authors of the 
Restatements should be applauded for their ongoing efforts, but a 
consideration of court decisions in this area reveals a cloudy picture. 
Recklessness is nebulous, existing in a bizarre twilight zone not 
susceptible to concrete prediction or accurate application. 
This Article has suggested that the Restatement’s current efforts to 
refine further the legal standard for recklessness may be misplaced. 
Revising a legal standard to achieve greater clarity only makes sense if 
that standard has some reliability, and some accuracy in terms of what that 
standard means to describe. Recklessness may not be such a standard. 
Behavioral economics suggests that the application of heuristics like over-
optimism bias and availability leads to systematic miscalculation of 
relevant probabilities. Neuroeconomics cautions that most human 
 
 
 418. The frontal lobes are the frontal areas of the mammalian brain, and include the prefrontal 
area, premotor area, and motor areas. See About Brain Injury: A Guide to Brain Anatomy, 
http://www.waiting.com/frontallobe.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). 
 419. Baird & Fugelsang, supra note 414, at 251–53. 
 420. Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the Criminal Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 
460 & nn.119–20 (2006). 
 421. Peggy Sasso, Implementing the Death Penalty: The Moral Implications of Recent Advances 
in Neuropsychology, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 788 (2007). 
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behavior is the product of unconscious or automated process, not the kind 
of conscious deliberation recklessness imagines. In the face of these new 
understandings of human behavior and cognition, it is unlikely that any 
effort to wring accuracy from the recklessness standard will bear fruit.  
Three possible avenues for moving forward exist, assuming that there 
is no general call to try to craft a description of recklessness that involves 
considering the way humans really behave and the way the brain really 
works.422 First, recklessness could be treated with greater indefinition, 
described not in terms of what it is but in terms of what it does. Second, 
the importance of recklessness in tort doctrine could be reduced through 
an elimination of the various exceptions to exceptions that elevate its 
financial significance. Third, we could simply await the results of the 
Third Restatement’s reform efforts in the hopes that a definition of 
recklessness drawing on the language of the MPC offers a better chance 
for consistent and predictable jurisprudence. For the reasons discussed 
below, the first option—embracing greater indefinition in the description 
of recklessness—would most likely lead to meaningful change. 
A. Towards Greater Indefinition 
Perhaps the problem is that recklessness has been defined in 
descriptive terms in the first place. Maybe the reformers working on a tort 
standard of recklessness should simply wash their hands of any effort to 
actually describe how people think. Kenneth Simons has suggested that 
recklessness in the criminal law is perhaps too descriptive. He wonders 
whether “the culpability provisions should be more thoroughly and 
explicitly evaluative, requiring the trier of fact to make a direct moral 
judgment about the wrongfulness of the conduct.”423 This Article has 
revealed that recklessness in tort, to the extent that it aims at description, 
is wholly inaccurate. In place of accurate assessments of descriptive 
recklessness, courts in fact do regularly substitute an evaluative, or moral 
gauge. If that is what is going on anyway, considerable judicial confusion 
could be reduced through a straightforward abandonment of description in 
favor of an explicit moral evaluation. 
 
 
 422. It would be difficult to imagine a definition of recklessness that, for instance, explicitly 
distinguished between liability for actions arising from “automated” processes and those arising from 
“conscious” deliberation. Certainly, our technology does not currently allow for distinctions to be 
drawn in individual cases (as opposed to revealing that, across various actors and types of actions, 
such distinctions do exist). 
 423. Simons, supra note 8, at 199. 
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If courts still value recklessness for its policy advantages, such as 
allowing a sympathetic victim to recover where law would otherwise bar, 
or placing special shame on a wrongdoer viewed as having a “dark heart,” 
why not jettison the description, indeed the category itself, in its entirety? 
Courts could simply set forth a standard, such as assumption of risk in the 
sports injury context, which bars recovery for mere negligence. Then, 
courts could preserve for themselves the freedom to disregard that 
standard in the face of compelling policy circumstances. Courts could 
name this doctrine whatever they want. Gross negligence, of course, is 
unlikely to be the chosen term given its tangled history. But why not 
something like, “negligence plus shame on you”? Or “naughty 
negligence”? Some term that captures the fact that in practice recklessness 
is little more than negligence with greater political or moral disapproval. 
Other terms like aggravated negligence, consequentially aggravated 
negligence, wrongful negligence, immoral negligence, dark heart 
negligence, or spiteful negligence, could be set forth as the standard for 
awarding punitive damages in non-intentional cases and establishing 
liability in other contexts where recklessness now plays a central role. A 
new term would give courts a clean slate on which to evaluate wrongful 
conduct, unburdened by hundreds of years of confusion over gross 
negligence, recklessness, and wanton and willful misbehavior. 
Importantly, a new term might capture the essence of recklessness 
without bogging down courts in linguistic analysis.424 Courts could forget 
about quantifying risk, separating grave from un-grave harms, and just do 
what they have always done when involving recklessness: decide whether 
or not to ignore black-letter rules based on the unusual facts of particular 
cases. A future Restatement of Torts, should it choose to embark on this 
path, would be better off not bothering to define the term at all. In other 
words, just set apart a certain category of behavior, but leave it 
uncluttered with clunky and anachronistic definitions. 
To the extent that the Restatement's authors are compelled to offer 
some further articulation of the tort of recklessness, it would be better to 
 
 
 424. Courts have embraced indefinition, to some extent, in the way in which they define 
proximate cause in jury instructions. At one point in time, judges sought to provide a detailed 
description of what was a proximate cause and what was not. But these kinds of efforts bogged courts 
down in battles over how to describe a deliberately vague, policy-motivated legal doctrine in a 
linguistically precise fashion. Rather than provide a detailed definition, the modern trend appears to be 
to leave the exact meaning of the term to juries. Johnson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 729 
N.E.2d 883, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[G]rafting the frequency, regularity, and proximity test onto 
jury instructions is likely to confuse, rather than clarify, the concept of proximate cause.”) (citing 
Spain v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 710 N.E.2d 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).  
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describe recklessness based on what it does, rather than what it is. For 
instance, consider the following language: 
Section 500. Aggravated Negligence [Reckless Conduct] 
Aggravated negligence [reckless conduct] is generally treated with 
the liability consequences associated with intentional tort even 
though the elements of intent are not present. For example, a victim 
of an actor's aggravated negligence [reckless conduct] may 
sometimes recover punitive damages and avoid the application of 
certain common law and statutory defenses. 
This is not a definition at all, but rather a description of consequence. 
My suggestion to replace an imprecise description with an undefined one 
is not foreign to tort law. The best example is proximate cause, a central 
element of negligence yet one rarely defined in specific terms.425 Instead, 
proximate cause is stated as an element of negligence but left for juries 
and judges to evaluate based on only the most general description.426 The 
idea of such an approach is to trust the moral intuition and sensibility of 
fact-finders.427 A similar approach might work in the context of 
recklessness. 
While one generally expects that clear legal rules generate greater 
consistency and predictability, it is important to emphasize the distinction 
between clarity and verbosity. A longer definition is not necessarily a 
clearer one. Relying on intuition in evaluating reckless conduct, as 
suggested here, would create the potential for inconsistency, as the moral 
sensibilities of courts and juries will differ across time and space. At the 
same time, I hope that it could also push the law towards unpredictability 
that is, frankly, less silly. At present, courts render unpredictable and 
chaotic decisions in part because they, to varying degrees at various times, 
focus on one factor over another. In spite of the appearance of analysis 
and rigor, what most courts are already doing is applying moral intuition. 
The proposed reworking of recklessness described here would reduce 
clutter and chaos and make it less likely that unimportant factors come to 
cloud recklessness determinations in a particular case.428  
 
 
 425. See Daniel J. Steinbock et al., Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 41 VAND. L. REV. 261, 
275–76 (1988). 
 426. See id. 
 427. See id. at 278–79 nn.95–98 and accompanying text. 
 428. In future work, I hope to explore how this proposed articulation of recklessness would play 
out in particular cases. For instance, would Sandler and Hackbart, discussed above, turn out the same 
if courts resisted focusing respectively on (1) the gravity of the injury posed and (2) the level of 
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Of course, such change could not be accomplished overnight. 
Countless state statutes establish liability using the term recklessness—
sometimes defining the term (awkwardly), other times leaving to courts 
the job of importing a description from the Restatements or elsewhere. It 
would take time to clean up the mess legislatures, courts, and the ALI 
have helped generate over the last hundred years of recklessness 
jurisprudence. But it is a project well worth our time. 
B. Collapsing the Exceptions to the Exceptions 
A second alternative to dealing with judicial confusion surrounding the 
boundaries of negligence, recklessness, and intentional tort would be to 
eliminate the middle category of recklessness by eradicating doctrinal 
“exceptions to exceptions.” While I suspect that courts and legislatures 
will not embrace this approach, it is worth some discussion. 
For example, the black-letter rule of law is that an injured person can 
recover from those whose negligence is the cause of those damages.429 
One exception to that rule is that, either due to a limited duty or the 
application of assumption of risk as a defense, participants in athletic 
contests may not recover from co-participants whose negligence causes 
them injury.430 The exception to the exception is that a “reckless” act can 
lead to liability of a sportsperson.431 One can easily defend the black-letter 
rule allowing recovery for negligence as advancing important economic 
and social policy objectives; similarly, one could defend the exception to 
 
 
“intent” involved in the wrongful act? Instead, courts would simply ask whether these represented 
appropriate instances in which to deviate from the general rule that neither a recreational user of 
public land nor a professional athlete can recover in the absence of intent. In Sandler, my suspicion is 
that the court following my proposed definition of recklessness would allow recovery. See infra notes 
288–96 and accompanying text. The state was clearly aware of the harm, did nothing to prevent it, and 
the plaintiff was quite literally exposed to a hidden trap as a result. In Hackbart, by contrast, a court 
would likely decline to award recovery to the plaintiff. See infra notes 159–68 and accompanying 
text. Since an intentional tort lawsuit would have been available to the plaintiff had he timely filed, 
there is simply no reason for the court to allow a recklessness claim to go forward—and the idea that 
the plaintiff did not discover the magnitude of his injury (in that it ended his career) until the statute 
had run is unsupported by the record. Moreover, the plaintiff in Hackbart had already played 
professionally for some sixteen years. Would it really be “unjust” to deny him recovery for the value 
of a lost year or two? Note that his thirteen-year career already exceeded the average professional 
football career by many years, and Hackbart might not have played much longer even in the absence 
of his injury at the hands of Charles Clark.  The average NFL playing career, according to the 
NFLPA, is just four years.  Bob Hille, The 120 Coolest Numbers in Sports, THE SPORTING NEWS, 
available at http://www.sportingnews.com/features/120th/numbers.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). 
It is no surprise that players in the league joke that the acronym “NFL” stands for “not for long.”  
 429. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1979). 
 430. See supra Part II.A. 
 431. See supra Part II.A. 
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that rule, as courts have done, by arguing that allowing negligence 
recovery in co-participant injury cases would lead to a flood of litigation 
and would deter the “vigorous competition” on which sport depends, and 
from which sport derives, its social and health benefits. But what policy 
basis is there for the exception to the exception? The most savage of 
cases—like the beating at issue in Hackbart432—can be addressed using 
intentional tort without any recourse to negligence, so long as plaintiffs 
file in time. What value, then, does the exception to the exception serve? 
It likely affects only a handful of cases in a state in a given year. Would 
anyone seriously argue that eliminating the option for recovery for 
recklessness would actually alter behavior in any meaningful way? By 
simply jettisoning the exception to the exception, courts could eliminate 
the importance of defining recklessness entirely. 
There are likely to be two prime sources of resistance to such an 
approach. First, to the extent that it encroaches on judicial autonomy or 
power, courts might object.433 But defending a rule on the basis that it 
gives courts power seems a thin justification on a social-policy level. 
More significantly, objections might arise in connection with the 
implications of this approach for punitive damages awards. The black-
letter rule of law is that damages are awarded for compensation in 
negligence cases.434 The exception is that punitive damages may be 
awarded as a special deterrent in cases of intentional harm (but not in 
accident cases).435 The exception to the exception here would be that 
punitive damages are possible in accidental injury cases even where intent 
cannot be proven so long as recklessness can be shown.436 Eliminating the 
exception to the exception would limit punitive damages to cases of 
intentional harm. 
This would obviously restrict the range of lawsuits in which punitive 
damages are available, or at least make it harder for plaintiffs to prove that 
punitive damages are warranted by requiring them to show intent. By 
reducing the availability of punitive damages, the elimination of 
exceptions to the exceptions could thus undercut the policy goals punitive 
damages are meant to serve: (1) punishing wrongdoers who possess ill 
 
 
 432. See supra Part III.A.  
 433. Under the “open courts” and “right to remedy” provisions of many state constitutions, courts 
have sometimes struck down legislative actions that are viewed as encroaching upon judicial power. 
See Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative Compensation for Medical 
Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 67 & n.27 (2008).  
 434. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979). 
 435. See id. § 908. 
 436. Id. 
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motive or dark hearts; and (2) providing additional deterrence to large, 
wealthy defendants (read: corporations) that would otherwise be happy to 
absorb litigation expenses.437 
Even assuming that one agrees with these proffered justifications for 
punitive damages, there is reason to doubt that severing the tie between 
punitive awards and recklessness would really change things all that 
much. The reason is that the Supreme Court has already, to a large extent, 
destroyed the significance and policy potency of punitive damages 
through its due process jurisprudence: BMW v. Gore,438 State Farm v. 
Campbell,439 and Philip Morris v. Williams.440 The Court has now 
suggested that punitive awards ought to be limited to a “nine to one” ratio 
between the punitive award and actual damages; without articulating a 
precise standard, the Court suggested that awards with ratios large than 
“single digits” would be presumed unconstitutional.441 But punitive 
damages may only have had real power to affect social behavior when far 
more extreme ratios—1000 to one or the like—were possible.442 This is 
not to say that the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is incorrect. Rather, 
the fact is simply that punitive damages do not pack the punch they used 
to.443 This suggests that, on a policy level, restricting the range of cases in 
which they are available might not be that big a deal. Given how 
atrophied the threat of punitive damages has become, would anyone really 
miss it? 
 
 
 437. See Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 
976–77 (2007). 
 438. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 439. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 440. Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 441. See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About Punitive Damages, TRIAL, May 2007, at 72, 
73 (discussing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25). 
 442. A punitive damages award nine times the compensatory damages suffered would still 
influence litigation decisions. Like treble damages in antitrust cases, the threat of punitive damages 
could serve to encourage settlements. However, it is arguable that punitive damages of a 9:1 ratio 
would not affect behavior in the world at large (that is, outside of the courtroom). See Kathleen S. 
Kizer, Note, California’s Punitive Damages Law: Continuing to Punish and Deter Despite State Farm 
v. Campbell, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 827, 887 (2006) (explaining that “one-size-fits-all” approach unlikely 
to serve deterrence objective behind punitive damages). If the possibility of causing a $100,000 injury 
would not alter corporate behavior, why would the possibility of causing a $500,000 injury? 
 443. See Leila C. Orr, Note, Making a Case for Wealth-Calibrated Punitive Damages, 37 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1739, 1762 (2004) (“In addition, if, as the Supreme Court suggests in State Farm, the 
ratio is limited to single-digit multipliers, then the deterrent effect of an award of punitive damages is 
further minimized.”); Larry S. Stuart, Constitutional Requirements for Punitive Damages, FLA. B.J., 
Mar. 2004, at 34, 37 (“Although defendant interests decry the unpredictability of punitive damages, it 
is that very feature that underlies their deterrent effect.”). 
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C. Hope for the Third Restatement 
A third option would be to hope that the forthcoming Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, now in its final draft stage, will offer an articulation of 
recklessness that clears up the confusion obvious in judicial opinions on 
the subject over the last half century. For a number of reasons, this hope is 
likely misplaced and this option is not the best way forward. 
The drafters of the Third Restatement recognized the need for further 
work on the description of recklessness. In published work and 
commentary released during the drafting process, the drafters have 
admitted they found defining recklessness to be “especially difficult.”444 
Notably, the authors found crafting a general definition hard because a 
description of recklessness that “works” in one context might not work in 
another.445 
The Proposed Final Draft of the Third Restatement (Physical Harm) 
makes significant linguistic modifications in defining recklessness. 
Largely, the Third Restatement adopts an articulation of recklessness 
modeled after the criminal law version embodied in the Model Penal 
Code. Still, the draft adopts a “rather traditional restatement approach 
. . . .”446 The draft provides: 
§ 2. Recklessness 
A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if: 
 (a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct 
or knows facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person’s 
situation, and 
 (b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk 
involves burdens that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the 
risk as to render the person’s failure to adopt the precaution a 
demonstration of the person’s indifference to the risk.447 
Although this proposed draft offers several improvements,448 the hope 
that courts will embrace it may be unrealistic.449 For instance, a number of 
 
 
 444. See Perlman & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 10. 
 445. Id. at 11. 
 446. Id. 
 447. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 2 (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005). 
 448. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1155. 
 449. Restatement efforts to reform tort law have not always been successful. For example, the 
Second Restatement’s suggestion that the terms “factual cause” and “proximate cause” be merged into 
a single “legal cause” test measured via “substantial factor” analysis was generally rejected by 
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courts are likely to reject the assertion in subsection (b) of the 
Restatement’s definition of recklessness that the relative ease with which 
risk could be avoided should be an indication of the actor’s indifference to 
the risk.450 This is meant to focus the recklessness inquiry on the ease with 
which a risk could be avoided rather than the magnitude of the risk (in the 
Second Restatement, a “substantial and unjustifiable” risk),451 which the 
Restatement’s authors believe has become too rigid a threshold for finding 
recklessness.452 While intellectually appealing, this innovation is unlikely 
to attract a wide following in the courts. It creates the possibility that an 
actor who creates a small risk (in absolute terms) that could be avoided by 
an extremely inexpensive precaution, could be labeled reckless.453 Such 
conduct, while economically inefficient, lacks the immoral character 
usually associated with recklessness.454 For that reason, courts are not 
likely to universally adopt this approach. 
The Third Restatement authors would further erode the requirement 
that, to be reckless, conduct pose a risk of death or serious bodily harm.455 
Although recklessness must involve “substantial” harm, it need not be 
limited to loss of life or limb.456 Would courts like the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts, which has only recently re-emphasized this bodily harm 
element, be likely to embrace a Restatement offering a looser 
requirement? 
In spite of their clarifying efforts, the authors of the Third Restatement 
acknowledge the inadequacies in their definition.457 Even where courts 
accept the word choice of the Third Restatement’s authors, however, the 
bigger problem is that they are unlikely to do away with the complex and 
confounding weight of authority discussing the various pieces of tort 
recklessness. That is to say, courts should be expected to “read in” to the 
new Restatement all of the various muddled precedents on recklessness 
they have produced over the last five decades. 
 
 
American courts and “has not . . . withstood the test of time, as it has proved confusing and has been 
misused.” REST. 3D, § 26 cmt. j & reporter’s notes cmt. j. 
 450. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1155. 
 451. Id.  
 452. See REST 3D, § 2 cmt. e. 
 453. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 7, at 1156. 
 454. Henderson and Twerski suggest imposing some minimum threshold for the absolute level of 
risk (such as “significant”) before recklessness (and all of its consequences) would be triggered. Id.  
 455. REST 3D, § 2 cmt. e. 
 456. Id. 
 457. See id. § 2 cmt. b. The authors describe their effort as one of “acknowledging and balancing 
several factors.” Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Tort law is not about punishment. Tort law is about assigning financial 
responsibility for injuries. In so doing, tort law aims to optimize the level 
of precaution brought to bear—to ensure that society does not waste 
resources avoiding injuries when the benefits of doing so do not outweigh 
the cost.458 Sometimes, the rules we adopt to produce optimal levels of 
caution do not seem to achieve that goal in circumstances we find 
troubling. Therefore, recklessness has survived in the law of tort. Maybe 
punitive damages are needed to discourage deep-pocketed corporate 
defendants from callously disregarding human life when it is cost-efficient 
to do so. But that does not mean that punitive damages need to be tied to 
an amorphous and ill-constructed legal doctrine. 
Two caveats are appropriate at this point. First, to the extent that the 
behavioral economics and neuroeconomics sources discussed above have 
called into question the role of consciousness in human decision making, 
one might wonder whether I mean to undercut intention in tort as well. 
That is not the case, at least as intentional tort is currently defined. To be 
liable for intentional tort, all one needs is belief in a substantial certainty 
of harmful consequence, and “belief” can of course be wrong.459 At a 
minimum, it need not be precise. But recklessness is more problematic 
because unlike intent, it requires consciousness or awareness of likely 
harm (or at least presumes the existence of a capacity to be consciously 
aware of likely harm). 
Second, while neurobiological explanations may serve to reduce the 
importance of the concept of blame, that is not to say that they reduce the 
need to engage in “forceful intervention in the face of violence or 
antisocial behaviour.”460 The criminal law and regulation should of course 
continue to target antisocial behavior for eradication. 
Alternatively, in lieu of greater “indefinition” in recklessness, the law 
could strive for further clarity through further description. We could add 
categories and subcategories and fill a treatise with precise terminology 
meant to better reflect the way that human actors behave in the face of 
uncertain risks. Moreover, recklessness could be explicitly defined 
 
 
 458. Ulen, supra note 340, at 400.  
 459. For a discussion of the meaning and role of belief in tort and criminal law, see Simons, 
Dimensions, supra note 9, at 302–04. 
 460. Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, in LAW & THE 
BRAIN, supra note 317, at 227, 240. 
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differently for different purposes,461 as it already is in practice. But greater 
description does not necessarily result in greater clarity. Given courts’ 
historical record interpreting recklessness, one must wonder if they would 
be able to keep things straight. 
 
 
 461. For example, the drafters of the Third Restatement have suggested that recklessness could 
have one definition in the context of punitive damages and another elsewhere in tort law. See REST 
3D, § 2 cmt. b; Simons, supra note 20, at 1089 n.99. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/3
